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Auditor liability is an important topic of accounting research as auditors respond 
to a constantly changing financial reporting and regulatory environment. Through three 
independent essays, I intend to explore how estimate uncertainty, financial statement 
aggregation, audit quality indicators, a company's investor base, and the size of the 
alleged misstatement can impact auditor liability both in the courtroom, as determined by 
jurors, and in out of court settlement, as determined by attorneys. I find that jurors do 
hold the auditor more likely to be negligent when audit quality indicators suggest the 
auditors did a poor quality audit. I also find that jurors hold auditors to be more negligent 
when both estimate uncertainty is low and the income statement is disaggregated. This 
juror finding is in contrast to lawyers where I find that high estimate uncertainty causes 
auditors’ lawyers to believe that the auditors are more vulnerable for failing to detect a 
material misstatement and make more concessions in out-of-court settlement negotiation. 
 Together, these studies have a number of important implications. First, the 
impact of high estimate uncertainty on auditor liability can go in opposite directions 
depending on whether the case disposition is determined by jurors or by lawyers 
negotiating settlement. Second, auditors’ legal counsel may erroneously concede during 
settlement negotiations based on incorrect beliefs about their vulnerability to jurors. 
viii 
 
Third, while accounting research has focused on juror judgments to proxy for auditor 
litigation risk, auditors may face very different litigation risk in out-of-court settlement, 
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Through three independent essays, I intend to explore how estimate uncertainty, 
financial statement aggregation, audit quality indicators, a company's investor base, and 
the size of the alleged misstatement can impact auditor liability both in the courtroom, as 
determined by jurors, and in out of court settlement, as determined by attorneys. 
My first essay on auditor liability investigates how a proposed auditing standard 
(AQIs), an existing financial accounting practice (aggregated vs. disaggregated financial 
statements), and a company’s investor base (institutional vs. individual investors), impact 
jurors’ assessments of auditor negligence following an undetected misstatement in the 
financial statements. I develop predictions suggesting that these three factors may interact 
in ways that standard setters do not anticipate. For example, my predictions suggest that 
the level of aggregation in the financial statements impacts the effectiveness of AQIs in 
informing jurors’ assessments of auditor negligence. In addition, these effects differ 
depending on whether the company’s investor base is primarily individual or institutional 
investors. Contrary to my predictions, jurors only rely on audit quality indicators to 
determine auditor liability. 
My second essay examines how financial statement aggregation and estimate 
uncertainty impacts juror assessments of auditor liability. I find that jurors hold auditors 
to a higher standard of care when (jointly) estimate uncertainty is low and the income 
statement is disaggregated. In contrast, auditors are held to a lower standard of care when 
either the income statement is disaggregated or estimate uncertainty is high (or both). 
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This interaction on the standard of care for auditors, in turn, impacts negligence 
judgments against auditors. These joint effects occur regardless of whether the range of 
estimate uncertainty is larger than or smaller than the material misstatement. While prior 
research suggests that aggregation makes auditors less likely to correct misstatements, my 
findings suggest (ironically) that it can simultaneously protect auditors from the legal 
risks of failing to correct some of those material misstatements. 
My third essay proposes that the effect of estimate uncertainty on auditor liability 
depends on whether the case is judged by jurors or negotiated in out-of-court settlement. 
Using the same experimental task, I predict and find that high estimate uncertainty causes 
auditors’ lawyers to believe that the auditors are more vulnerable for failing to detect a 
material misstatement and make more concessions in out-of-court settlement negotiation, 
regardless of whether the misstatement is in an aggregated or disaggregated line-item. 
Consistent with my theory, these directionally opposite effects stem from lawyers’ 
inability to predict jurors’ judgments accurately. 
Together, these studies have a number of implications. First, the impact of high 
estimate uncertainty on auditor liability can go in opposite directions depending on 
whether the case disposition is determined by jurors or by lawyers negotiating settlement. 
Second, auditors’ legal counsel may erroneously concede during settlement negotiations 
based on incorrect beliefs about their vulnerability to jurors. Third, while accounting 
research has focused on juror judgments to proxy for auditor litigation risk, auditors may 
face very different litigation risk in out-of-court settlement, where the vast majority of 




THE IMPACT OF AUDIT QUALITY INDICATORS, FINANCIAL 
STATEMENT AGGREGATION, AND INVESTOR BASE ON AUDITOR LIABILITY 
2.1 Introduction 
Recently, the PCAOB and other auditing standard setting bodies have been 
contemplating mandatory reporting of audit quality indicators (CAQ 2014; PCAOB 2013 
Dickens, Fay and Reich 2014). These audit quality indicators (hereafter, “AQIs”) will 
provide stakeholders engagement-level insight into the quality of the audits being 
performed by firms. While the AQIs promise to bring greater transparency to the audit 
process, little empirical research has been done examining the use and perception of these 
measures by various stakeholders and other important accounting decision-makers. Thus 
far, much of the debate surrounding AQIs has focused on which metrics could be used to 
capture audit quality (e.g., Jonas 2013; Martin 2013; CAQ 2014). In this study, I 
investigate the implications of AQI on jurors’ judgments of auditor negligence. 
Disclosure of AQIs has been a highly controversial proposal among audit firms 
concerned with the implications for their litigation risks (Bedard, Johnstone, and Smith 
2010). In this study, I investigate different conditions in which disclosure of AQIs may or 
may not elevate auditor liability. 
While auditors may be facing new requirements to disclose AQIs, GAAP allows 
companies significant discretion in the level of disaggregated information they disclose in 
the financial statements. As Libby and Emmett (2014) review, at a minimum, GAAP only 
requires that operating expenses (including all cost of goods sold, selling, general, and 
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administrative expenses) be broken down into two line-items on the income statement. 
While companies can voluntarily elect to disaggregate the income statement more (and 
many do), there is a large variance in the level of disaggregation in publicly filed annual 
reports, as well as a large variance in which expenses are included in a particular line-
item, even within the same industry (Libby and Emmett 2014). GAAP is mostly silent on 
the question of line-item aggregation, and the few statements by the FASB on it have 
alternated between positive and negative viewpoints on its costs and benefits for users of 
the financial statements (e.g., FASB 1984, 1979; Libby and Emett 2014).  
In this study, I investigate how AQIs and the level of financial statement 
aggregation may jointly impact jurors’ assessments of auditor liability in a litigation 
context. In addition, I examine the effects of these variables when the company’s investor 
base includes both individual and institutional investors. Compared to individual 
investors, institutional are more sophisticated (e.g., Ke and Ramalingegowda 2005). That 
is, institutional investors have more resources and ability to process available information 
behind their investment decisions. Compared to novices, experts assimilate informational 
cues into their judgments and decisions more efficiently and more effectively (e.g., 
Johnson 1988), and are therefore generally expected by others to perform better in 
judgment settings that involve incorporating various informational cues into their 
decisions (e.g., Camerer and Johnson 1997; Mnookin 2008). Because of this, I theorize 
that jurors will place different expectations on institutional investors and individual 
investors in their reactions to AQIs and aggregated financial statement information. 
Jurors will assign blame for investors’ losses following an undetected misstatement to 
multiple parties, including to the investors themselves (Arel, Jennings, Pany, and Reckers 
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2012). I expect that jurors will assign blame to auditors differently depending on the type 
of investor and their different abilities to process AQIs and aggregated financial 
statement information.  
My predictions give rise to possible unintended consequences of AQIs and 
aggregated financial statements. For example, when the investor base consists primarily 
of individual investors, I expect that jurors will form auditor negligence judgments 
consistent with AQIs being diagnostic of audit quality. That is, when the plaintiffs are 
primarily individual investors, jurors will hold auditors more negligent for an ex post 
undetected misstatement as the AQIs indicate other negative ex ante audit quality cues. 
However, when plaintiffs are primarily institutional investors, I expect that jurors will 
expect these more expert investors to have assimilated AQIs into their judgments more 
fully as an ex ante audit quality cue prior to (or concurrent with) their investment 
decision. Consequently, when AQIs are negative, I expect that jurors will hold 
institutional investors relatively more responsible for their decision to invest in the 
company, having invested in a company with a lower quality auditor. As jurors hold 
investors more responsible for their own investment losses, they tend to hold auditors less 
responsible for them (Arel et al. 2012). As a result of this theory, I develop hypotheses 
that AQIs may have very different and possibly even opposite effects on auditor 
negligence judgments, depending on the type of investors who experienced the losses. 
 My findings provide insight for standard setters potential impacts that could arise 
from mandating disclosure of AQIs. Specifically, jurors only believe auditors to more 
likely be negligent when the AQIs indicate the auditor performed a lower quality audit. 
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2.2 Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Audit Quality Indicators 
 While investors and other financial statement users can use ex post outcome 
measures as noisy proxies for audit quality (e.g., discretionary accruals, restatements, 
propensity to issue going concern opinions), very little information is available about the 
quality of ex ante audit processes. Furthermore, ex post outcomes are a mixture of audit 
quality and financial reporting quality (i.e., auditor behavior and manager behavior), 
whereas the quality of audit inputs and processes are more directly controlled by the 
auditor. In addition, ex post outcomes (even those related to misstatements) are noisier 
signals of audit quality (than ex ante input and process information) since audits only 
provide reasonable assurance against negative outcomes, but absolute assurance of ex 
ante due professional care (Peecher and Piercey 2008). Because of this, and because of 
the high social costs of undetected misstatements in high-profile accounting failures, 
investors, regulators, and groups have called for more disclosure from audit firms on the 
quality of their audit processes (e.g., PCAOB 2012; POB 2006; Pritchard & Puri 2006; 
PCA 2012). Recent research shows that investors in particular call for more information 
about specific audit inputs and processes, rather than outputs (Christensen, Glover, Omer 
and Shelley 2014). 
One proposed solution has been to require firms to measure and disclose a 
standard set of audit quality indicators (AQIs) (e.g., PCAOB 2013; Jonas 2013; CAQ 
2014). While much of the ensuing debate has focused on what measures should be 
required (e.g., CAQ 2014, Martin 2013; Christensen et al. 2014), there has also been both 
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strong opposition and support for requiring AQIs and their disclosure at all. As Dickens, 
Fay, and Reich (2014) note, the frequent expectation expressed in the debate is that AQIs, 
including firm- and engagement-specific data, would eventually be made public to help 
investors and other stakeholders assess audit quality. Proponents of AQIs argue that 
public disclosure would be the very point of AQIs since there is otherwise a paucity of 
data about the quality of audit processes and specific areas of the audit, especially at the 
engagement level. Opponents of AQIs argue that their disclosure could cause audit firms 
to audit myopically to meet the measures (i.e., alter their behavior to posture for the AQIs 
rather than to minimize detection risk), out of fear of increased litigation risk (Bedard et 
al. (2010). I investigate the implications of AQIs for auditor liability in a juror setting to 
investigate when AQIs elevate or diminish auditors’ liability risks. This responds to the 
call of Kachelmeier and King (2002) to use of experiments to test the implications of 
proposed new disclosures (such as AQIs) before they are implemented or soon after (e.g., 
Fanning, Agoglia, and Piercey 2015). 
2.2.2 Financial Statement Line-Item Aggregation 
 A large archival research investigates the implications of business segment 
aggregation or disaggregation in the financial statements, but a relatively small and recent 
research literature has begun examining the implications of financial statement line-item 
aggregation or disaggregation (see Libby and Emett 2014 for a review). International 
accounting standards generally require some disaggregation of the income statement into 
distinct line-items, although their rules give companies significant latitude (IASB 2009; 
Libby and Brown 2013). In contrast, GAAP provides almost no guidance to companies 
about the level of aggregation or disaggregation that is appropriate (Libby and Emett 
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2014). For example, Libby and Brown (2014) illustrate alternative representations of an 
income statement, both acceptable under GAAP, that show operating expenses in as few 
as two and as many as twelve line-items.  
 Most research so far has investigated the effects of line-item aggregation on 
investor decision making. Elliott et al. (2015) use an experimental market in which 
investors receive earnings information that is either aggregated, disaggregated into 
recurring earnings components (i.e., income from continuing operations) and non-
recurring events (i.e., extraordinary items), or consisting of recurring components only. 
Aggregation improved market efficiency overall, but long investors tended to mis-use 
disaggregated non-recurring events. Bonner et al. (2014) find that how investors 
aggregated or disaggregated information depends on whether and how it combines or 
disaggregates combinations of gains and losses. Finally, Bloomfield et al. (2015) find no 
significant effects of line-item disaggregation on credit analysts’ judgments, and 
conclude that standards requiring disaggregation may not meaningfully impact users’ 
judgments. 
 In an auditing context, Libby and Brown (2013) demonstrate that auditors are 
more willing to accept misstated financial statements when the misstatement is 
aggregated together with other, cleaner financial statement accounts in the same line-
item. This suggests that aggregation potentially increases systemic audit risk (the risk of 
materially misstated financial statements with a clean audit opinion), and that managers 
can potentially use aggregation as a means of concealing earnings management from 
auditors (cf. Luippold, Kida, Piercey and Smith 2014). Furthermore, in the second study 
of my dissertation, I find that jurors find auditors less negligent when an undetected 
9 
 
misstatement is aggregated with other, cleaner financial statement accounts than when it 
is disaggregated in the financial statements, but only for misstatements stemming from 
accounting estimates of relatively low inherent uncertainty. I found this pattern of results 
even though, ex post, jurors believed that auditors had an unconditionally high obligation 
to prevent the undetected misstatement, regardless of aggregation, disaggregation, or 
estimate uncertainty.  
2.2.3 Investor Base 
Prior accounting research has shown that stakeholders in a company perceive 
differences in vulnerability between individual and institutional investors (Kang 2015). 
Individual investors might appear vulnerable for a variety of reasons. Institutional 
investors are often highly sophisticated investors, highly educated in finance, economic 
modeling, and accounting while many individual investors lack even a general business 
background. As a result, individual investors, generally speaking, will have less ability to 
interpret and use the accounting information provided. 
 Another reason individual investors could be perceived to be more vulnerable 
than institutional investors is because they have less access to information. Institutional 
investors, by definition, are part of financial firms, investing groups, or other large 
organizations. These groups often provide access to specialized reports, databases, and 
content normally unavailable outside of the organization. Without access to additional 
information provided by large financial institutions, individual investors will be more 
reliant on the audit opinion of the financial statements and less able to supplement their 
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investment decisions with outside sources which could give them better indication of the 
quality of the assurance being provided.  
Finally, individual investors often will lack the same economic resources that 
institutional investors have. A common proxy in the archival literature for institutional 
investors are investment managers who are required to file Form 13F disclosures with the 
SEC. One of the requirements for an investment manager who files Form 13F is that they 
must manage at least $100 million in securities. Individual investors, with their much 
smaller portfolios, will likely be perceived as being more vulnerable because the same 
loss or harm that would not be noticed by a institutional investor could devastate a 
individual investor. 
2.2.4 Joint Effects of Aggregation and Investor Type 
Pitesa and Thau (2014) find that harm to a more vulnerable group results in 
harsher moral judgments by third party observers. Because individual investors are a 
more vulnerable investor base, I would expect higher assessments of auditor negligence 
when the company’s investor base is primarily composed of individual investors. 
However, the impact of a company’s investor base is likely to be moderated by 
the level of financial statement aggregation. Prior accounting research has found that 
auditors and jurors perceive misstatements to be more material when the income 
statement accounts are disaggregated into more line-items (Libby and Brown 2013). As 
alleged misstatements are perceived to be more material, they are likely to be perceived 
to impact and harm investors more. As a result, disaggregating the income statement 
would be likely increase jurors’ negligence assessments against the auditor, since it 
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increases perceptions of the materiality of misstatement. However, the impact of a more 
negative outcome on jurors’ assessments of auditor negligence should be larger when it 
results in losses to a more vulnerable group. As a result, this increase in auditor liability is 
likely to be greater when the company’s investor base is primarily individual investors 
rather than institutional investors. Individual investors, who are perceived as being more 
vulnerable than institutional investors, will be perceived as lacking the ability to cope 
with the losses, particularly losses that appear larger and more material. In contrast, for 
institutional investors, while they will also have higher negligence judgments when the 
financial statements are disaggregated, they will be perceived as having a greater ability 
to cope and deal with losses of any size than the more vulnerable individual investors, 
and as a consequence will have a smaller increase in negligence judgments. I formally 
state my interaction hypothesis between investor base and financial statement as follows. 
H1: Disaggregating the financial statements will lead to a greater increase in 
jurors’ negligence judgments for individual investors than for institutional 
investors. 
2.2.5 Disaggregation and Audit Quality Indicators (AQIs)  
Examples of typical AQIs recently proposed include number of hours incurred by 
specialists and the national office, the audit team’s industry experience, training hours of 
audit personnel, engagement hours, and CPA certification of the audit staff. While these 
individual AQI metrics may not directly relate to the causal process behind a specific 
undetected misstatement in a particular area of the audit and of the financial statements, 
they will likely provide jurors rough impressions of the quality of the auditor. Audit 
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quality is a difficult construct to define (Francis 2004, 2011). Furthermore, forming a 
single mental representation is a persistently difficult task for individuals (Camerer and 
Johnson 1997). In particular, juror’s affective reactions to the AQIs are more likely to 
persist in their working memory than the specific details of the AQIs themselves (cf. 
Kida, Smith and Maletta 1998). That is, whether the AQIs are generally good or bad is 
the most likely trait to influence juror decision making further (cf. Kida and Smith 1995). 
Finally, as jurors sense that they have incomplete information with which to evaluate 
auditors and attempt to fill in the gaps (cf., Peecher and Piercey 2008), they may assume 
that, if the AQIs are consistently positive or negative, that other, similar signals of audit 
quality exist as well. 
Normally, the higher and better the AQIs are, the more likely the auditor has 
performed a good audit and the less likely jurors will hold the auditor negligent.  
However, prior research indicates that the impact of ex ante audit quality cues is likely to 
be diminished or eliminated when negative outcome information about an undetected 
material misstatement is provided (Kadous 2000, Kadous 2001). In my setting, financial 
statement aggregation or disaggregation does not actually alter the existence of a material 
misstatement itself. However, the second study in my dissertation shows aggregation 
(disaggregation) of the income statement can make an undetected material misstatement 
appear less (more) material, even when the magnitude of the material misstatement and 
its impact on net income are held constant. Thus, I still expect that when the financial 
statements are disaggregated, jurors will perceive the ex post misstatement to be more 
material, and will react less to the AQIs as ex ante indicators of audit quality, as they 
assess auditor negligence. Thus, when financial statements are disaggregated, I would 
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expect that AQIs would not impact the jurors’ negligence judgments to the same degree 
as they would if the financial statements were aggregated. When the financial statements 
are aggregated, jurors perceive the alleged misstatement to be less severe and are more 
likely to react primarily to the ex ante measures of audit quality. Thus, when the financial 
statements are aggregated, I expect jurors to use the AQIs in their negligence judgments 
more and judge negligence as increasing when the AQIs show decreasing levels of audit 
quality. I formally state this interaction prediction as follows: 
H2: The difference between jurors’ negligence assessments for good, mixed, and 
bad AQIs will be greater when the financial statements are aggregated than when 
they are disaggregated.  
 If supported, this hypothesis suggests that jurors’ attention to ex ante audit cues 
depends not only on whether or not negative outcome information is provided (Kadous 
2000, 2001), but also extends to the formatting of a material misstatement (i.e., 
aggregated with other accounts or not), holding constant the material misstatement itself, 
when it is provided, and its impact on earnings. 
2.2.6 The Joint Effect of Investor Base and Audit Quality Indicators 
An extensive literature in psychology distinguishes between conditions in which 
people have the ability to make good or bad decisions for themselves, and conditions in 
which people are the target of others’ good or bad decisions (Eshleman 2004, Gray et al. 
2007, Gray and Wegner 2009, Bernstein 1998, Bratman 1987). Decisions of innocence, 
victimization, and blameworthiness are influenced by whether individuals are relatively 
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more ability to make good or bad decisions, or whether they are the target of others’ good 
or bad decisions (Alicke 2000, Pizarro et al. 2003).  
Institutional have more resources for and are more expert at processing available 
information behind their investment decisions (e.g., Ke and Ramalingegowda 2005; 
Piotriski and Roulstone 2004). In contrast, individual investors are more likely to trade on 
poor information, to misuse information, or trade without information (e.g., DeLong, 
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann 1989, 1991; Fanning et al. 2015). As such, individual 
investors seem particularly dependent on corporate governance mechanisms in order to 
realize safe investment outcomes.  
Compared to novices, experts are generally expected by others to perform better 
in judgment settings that involve incorporating various informational cues into their 
decisions (e.g., Camerer and Johnson 1997; Johnson 1988; Mnookin 2008). Because of 
this, jurors are likely to place different expectations on institutional investors and 
individual investors. Because audits provide only reasonable assurance against 
undetected misstatements, investors retain some residual risk of undetected material 
misstatements, even after an independent audit is conducted. Consistent with this, 
empirical evidence shows that jurors will assign blame for investors’ losses following an 
undetected misstatement to multiple parties, including to the investors themselves Arel et 
al. (2012). Accordingly, I expect that jurors will hold institutional investors to a higher 
standard for assuming residual misstatement risk and for processing available cues than 
they hold individual investors. That is, jurors will hold institutional investors’ investment 
decisions in a “buyer beware” mindset, in which investors are more responsible to 
internalize all of the risks that they face, including the implications of AQIs.  
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These different expectations for individual and institutional investors overall 
suggest that jurors’ will view the implications of AQIs differently depending on the type 
of investors who lost money due to an audit failure. When the investor base consists 
primarily of individual investors, I expect that jurors will form auditor negligence 
judgments consistent with their affective reactions to the AQIs. That is, when the 
plaintiffs are primarily individual investors, I expect that jurors will (quite simply) hold 
auditors more (less) responsible for plaintiffs’ losses when AQIs are more suggestive of 
other low (high) audit quality cues.  
In contrast, when the investor base consists primarily of institutional investors, 
jurors will recall the valence of the AQIs (cf. Smith and Kida 1995), and will more likely 
to expect that these more expert investors should have assimilated signals of audit quality 
into their judgments more fully as they made their investment decisions. Consequently, 
when AQIs are negative, I expect that jurors will hold institutional investors relatively 
more responsible for their decision to invest in the company, having chosen to rely on a 
lower-quality auditor. This is consistent with prior auditor liability research which has 
shown that the more knowledgeable a person is to process relevant information and make 
a judgment, the higher the blame they are assessed for failing to properly process that 
information when the judgment is proven to be incorrect (Grenier, Pomeroy, and Stern 
2015). It is also consistent with prior research suggesting that jurors have different 
affective reactions to different plaintiffs (e.g., Mazella and Feingold 1994) and as a result 
would likely hold them to different standards for their investment decisions. As jurors 
hold institutional investors more responsible for their own investment losses, they would 
then tend to hold auditors less responsible for them (Arel et al. 2012).   
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Similarly, when the AQIs are relatively positive, jurors will likely expect 
institutional investors to have relied more (than individual investors would) on these (and 
potentially other) indicators of audit quality. In the event of an undetected misstatement, 
institutional investors were relying on ostensibly high quality auditors more, and 
therefore appear less culpable for negative outcomes that follow. In this case, I expect 
that jurors will hold auditors relatively more negligent when the plaintiffs are institutional 
investors and the AQIs are positive. Note that this prediction is the opposite pattern that I 
expect when the plaintiffs are individual investors. That is, jurors will hold auditors less 
(more) responsible for institutional investors’ losses when AQIs are suggestive of low 
(high) audit quality (i.e., “buyer beware”).  
If supported, these different effects would also suggest that, when AQIs are 
negative, jurors will hold auditors more responsible for individual investors’ losses than 
for institutional investors’ losses (because they would ostensibly be more forewarned of 
lower audit quality; “buyer beware”). In contrast, when AQIs are positive, jurors will 
hold auditors more responsible for institutional investors’ losses than they would 
individual investors’ losses (because institutional investors would process positive audit 
quality signals more and therefore rely on them more). This discussion suggests an 
interaction and specific simple effects. Stated formally: 
H3a: AQI × Investor Base Interaction: Negative (positive) AQIs will 
increase (decrease) jurors’ judgments of auditor negligence more when the 
company’s investor base consists primarily of individual investors than 
when it consists primarily of institutional investors.  
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H3b: Simple effects of AQI given Investor Base: Negative (positive) 
AQIs will increase (decrease) jurors’ judgments of auditor negligence 
when the company’s investor base consists primarily of individual 
investors, but will decrease (increase) jurors’ judgments of auditor 
negligence when it consists primarily of institutional investors.  
H3c: Simple effects of Investor Base given AQI: Jurors’ negligence judgments 
will be higher for individual investors than institutional investors when the auditor 
has better AQIs, however, jurors’ negligence judgments will be lower for 
institutional investors than individual investors when AQIs are worse. 
 If supported, these hypotheses suggest that, contrary to concerns that disclosure of 
AQIs will uniformly elevate auditors’ litigation risk, whether it does so or not will 
depend on the type of investors primarily invested in a particular audit client. 
2.2.7 Joint Effects of Investor Base, Audit Quality Indicators (AQIs), and Financial 
Statement Aggregation 
The interaction between AQIs and the company’s investor base (H3a) could also 
be moderated by the level of aggregation in the company’s financial statements. In the 
second study of my dissertation, disaggregating the financial statements makes the 
alleged misstatement of an account appear more material and larger to jurors. As the 
alleged misstatement appears larger and more material to jurors, they will pay more 
attention to the perceived size of the misstatement and less on the company’s investor 
base or the AQIs. That is, just as I expect disaggregation of a material misstatement to 
cause the negative outcome to dominate jurors’ consideration of ex ante AQI cues (as I 
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predicted in H2), I also expect disaggregation to of a material misstatement to dominate 
jurors’ consideration of how different investors use and rely on ex ante AQI cues 
differently. Thus in the disaggregated condition, I would expect the company’s investor 
base and AQIs to be less influential on juror’s assessments of auditor negligence because 
the participants are more heavily using the size of the alleged misstatement in their 
decision-making. In contrast, when the financial statements are more aggregated, jurors 
will be less influenced by the size of the alleged statement and base their decision more 
on other factors, including the company’s AQIs and investor base. I formally state the 
hypothesis as follows: 
H4: The AQI × Investor Base interaction predicted in H3a will be larger when the 
material misstatement is in an aggregated financial statement line-item than when 
it is disaggregated.  
If supported, this hypotheses suggests that the implications of AQI disclosure for 
audit firms depends partially on whether investors are primarily institutional or individual 
investors, particularly when financial statements are more aggregated. This conclusion 
would inform the debate over disclosure of AQIs, in which opponents argue that they will 
unfairly and unconditionally elevate auditors’ litigation risk. For example, negative AQIs 
may not necessarily have this effect as strongly the investors are primarily institutional, 








I recruited 691 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Mechanical Turk 
participants have been shown to be at least as representative of the US adult population as 
other common participant pools (Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010; Buhrmester, 
Kwang, and Gosling 2011; Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser 2011) and commonly used in 
prior accounting research needing potential juror participants (e.g., Grenier et al. 2014; 
Maksymov and Nelson 2014).  
I pre-screened potential participants in multiple ways. First, I only used 
Mechanical Turk participants who had approval rates over XX% for at least XX past 
Mechanical Turk tasks (which are based on the rate at which demanders of online labor 
in the Mechanical Turk marketplace have approved and identified the individual 
participant as providing quality work and responses), who are located in the United 
States, and who have not taken the survey previously. Second, potential study 
participants who matched this profile filled out a demographics survey indicating whether 
they are US citizens at or above the age of 18 (which are requirements to be a juror in the 
US). They answered this question without yet knowing that there would be an 
opportunity to participate in an additional study for more compensation. Third, this 
demographic survey also included an attention check question. Specifically, sole 
instructions for the materials began with a notice labeled “IMPORTANT” (bolded), 
followed by the correct answer they should respond with to a subsequent survey question 
on the next screen asking which industry they most closely associated with northern 
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Rhode Island. Participants were compensated $0.20 for completing this brief survey. 
Potential participants who were not automatically screened out by the attention check 
question then learned of the opportunity to earn an additional $2.50 if they participated in 
the study, and an additional $1.00 if they passed two attention check questions in the 
study. These payments meet or exceed the best practice norms for Amazon Mechanical 
Turk for the amount of time required to complete the tasks (Downs, Holbrook, Sheng, 
and Cranor 2010). Finally, the experimental instrument gathered time spent on the task 
and in different parts of the task. The use of pre-screening, attention check questions, best 
practice payment rates per hour, additional payment contingent on attention, and 
gathering task time data are all recommended to ensure high-quality responses on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (Downs et al. 2010). Out of the original 691 participants, only 
434 passed the screening questions and decided to participate in the main study. 
2.3.2 Experimental Design 
My experiment employs a 2 × 3 × 2 between-subjects design. I manipulate the 
primary investor base of the company (institutional investors vs. individual investors), 
the overall interpretation of the AQIs (good vs. mixed vs. bad), and the level of 
aggregation (more aggregated vs. more disaggregated). Participants were randomly 
assigned to experimental conditions by the Qualtrics survey that I posted to the Amazon 






2.3.3 Task and Manipulation 
Participants read an adapted juror case study that has been extensively used in 
prior research (e.g., Kadous 2000, Peecher and Piercey 2008).1 Similar to Peecher and 
Piercey (2008) and the second study of my dissertation, I provided background 
information that explained relevant accounting and legal terms (e.g. materiality, 
misstatement, reasonable assurance, negligence) that might be unfamiliar to participants 
but would be explained during a courtroom trial. The background information also 
described the role and function of the auditor and what would happen if the auditor failed 
to exercise due care. To encourage attention, the instructions told participants that the 
task would include review questions to ensure that participants read and understood the 
concepts covered. 
Participants then read about a fictional company, Big Time Gravel that is audited 
by Jones & Company. They learned that Big Time Gravel has highly customizable 
machinery that is neither bought nor sold on the open market, and therefore does not have 
a readily available market value. During the auditors’ test of asset impairment, they 
assigned a reasonable valuation of the machinery between $450 and $550 million. Since 
management of Big Time Gravel assigned a value of $545 million, they recorded a $10 
million impairment loss in the financial statements, which Jones & Company had deemed 
acceptable. Participants then learned that the company’s machinery has experienced 
difficulty, triggering enormous losses for the Big Time Gravel and its investors.  
                                                          
1 The case was also reviewed for realism by four legal professionals with a combined 38 years of legal 
experience, including a former law school dean and a clerk for one of district courts of the United States.  
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At this point in the case, participants encountered my investor base manipulation. 
In the individual (sophisticated) investor base condition, participants are informed that 
85% of the company’s investor base is composed of individual (institutional) investors 
including retirees, current and former employees, and other people saving money 
(pension funds, hedge funds, mutual funds, and Wall Street investment companies that 
manage at least 100 million). Participants are then informed that, compared to the other 
type of investor, these individual (institutional) investors generally have less (more) 
resources, have less (more) access to information about a company, and are often less 
(more) highly educated about investments.  
Participants are then informed that the investors have decided to sue Jones and 
Company. They are provided information regarding the AQIs by an expert witness. In the 
good (bad) AQI condition, the expert witness pointed out that all six of the highlighted 
AQIs indicated higher (lower) audit quality than for the previous year. In the mixed AQI 
condition, two AQIs indicated higher audit quality, two indicated lower audit quality, and 
two indicated similar audit quality to the previous year. In all conditions, participants 
were informed that were no significant changes to the operations or risks the Big Time 
Gravel faced in the year of alleged misstatement compared to the prior year. 
Participants then read that witnesses for the investors testified the true value of the 
machinery should have been $495 million and that a $60 million impairment loss should 
have been recorded instead of $10 million. If Big Time Gravel had recorded a $60 
million impairment loss, operating income would be reduced by 1.3% and the company 
would fail to meet analysts’ earnings target for the company, making the alleged 
misstatement both quantitatively significant using conventional materiality cutoffs (e.g., 
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Hatfield, Houston, Stefaniak, and Usrey al. 2010) and qualitatively material (SEC 1999). 
Investors allege that if the loss of $60 million was to have been recorded by the company, 
they would have not remained invested in the company. 
Finally, similarly to the second study of my dissertation, participants read an 
excerpt from Big Time Gravel’s income statement, with columns showing the numbers as 
reported in the audited financial statements, the numbers as the investors’ expert 
witnesses testified that they should have been reported, and the difference between the 
two as a dollar and percentage difference. In the more (less) aggregated financial 
statement conditions, “Cost of goods sold” was reported as a single line-item (broken 
down into nine separate line-items, including a separate line-item for the impairment loss 
on the machinery) (cf. Libby and Emett 2014). 
2.3.4 Response Variable and Post Experimental Questions 
The primary dependent variable for this study is negligence, or participants’ 
ratings of how negligent the auditors were in failing to accurately assess the impairment 
loss of Big Time Gravel’s Machinery. It is measured on a 10-point scale from “Not at all 
negligent” to “Completely negligent”.  
I also gathered a series of supplemental measures from participants. First, I asked 
participants how material of an impact the misstatement would have on the judgment of a 
reasonable person relying on the financial statements (materiality–overall), as well as 
how material its impact was on the financial statement line-item that it appeared in 
(materiality–line-item). I then asked participants to rate how much they could relate to the 
investors in the case (investor relatability), how much they believed the investors were 
significantly impacted by their losses (investor impact), and how much the investors 
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relied on the financial statements for their investment in Big Time Gravel (investor 
reliance).  Additionally, I asked participants how vulnerable they believe the investors 
were (investor vulnerability), followed by three questions designed to investigate why 
participants might view individual investors as more vulnerable than institutional 
investors, and which aspect of their different levels of vulnerability might play a role in 
observed effects between my manipulations and the dependent variable. Specifically, I 
asked them the extent to which they believe the investors in this case were vulnerable due 
to the resources they had (investor vulnerability–resources), due to the access to 
information that they had to evaluate Big Time Gravel (investor vulnerability–
information access), and due to their ability to evaluate Big Time Gravel’s financial 
statements (investor vulnerability –ability).  All of these post-experimental questions 
were measured on 10-point scales. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Comprehension Check and Manipulation Checks 
 Of the 434 participants, 27 participants did not finish the study and were removed 
from analysis. Participants answered four questions checking their understanding of 
materiality, reasonable assurance, negligence, and other legal/auditing concepts. Their 
accuracy ranged from 98.5 to 99% (401 to 403 out of 407) on the four questions, 
indicating a high level of comprehension of the background information. Thus, the 
participants appeared to have the same basic auditing and legal understanding a 
reasonably attentive juror would have. To make sure participants paid attention to my 
AQIs and investor base manipulations, I asked participants to identify the investor base of 
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the company and the audit quality indicators. 399 participants correctly identified the 
audit quality indicators of Big Time Gravel while 402 correctly identified the investor 
base of the company.2 
 To check my aggregation manipulation, I use my materiality-line-item and 
materiality-overall measures and find that participants perceived the alleged 
misstatement to be more material to the line item (6.40 vs. 5.56, t=3.38, F=11.475, 
p=.001) and more material to the financial statements as a whole (5.70 vs. 6.40, t=2.79, 
F=7.819, p=.005) when the financial statements were disaggregated instead of 
aggregated. Thus my manipulations appear to have been successful. 
2.4.2 Hypothesis Tests 
 Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics and ANOVA results for how 
negligent participants believed Jones and Company were in performing the audit for Big 
Time Gravel. The higher the rating, the more the participants believe the auditor will 
likely be found negligent. 
  
                                                          
2 I drop participants who did not complete the study or failed the manipulation attention check questions 
from further analysis resulting in a final sample of 396 participants. Results remain qualitatively unchanged 







Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
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   st. dev. (n)  2.66 (36) 2.65 (32) 
 
2.74 (33) 2.74 (35) 
 
2.70 (69) 2.68 (67) 
Mixed 





   st. dev. (n) 1.96 (32) 2.46 (35) 
 
2.46 (33) 2.60 (33) 
 
2.22 (65) 2.53 (68) 
Bad       
   Mean 5.29 6.22  5.80 5.93  5.52 6.08 
   st. dev. (n) 2.67 (35) 2.18 (32)  2.34 (30) 2.30 (30)  2.52 (65) 2.23 (62) 
 





Square F p 
 Investor base 7.87 1 7.87 1.26 0.262 
 AQIs 110.55 2 55.27 8.86 < 0.001 
 Aggregation 4.49 1 4.49 0.72 0.397 
 Investor base × AQIs 18.55 2 9.27 1.49 0.228 
 Investor base × aggregation 0.07 1 0.07 0.01 0.915 
 AQIs × aggregation 1.62 2 0.81 0.13 0.878 
 Three-way interaction 18.24 2 9.12 1.46 0.233 








 H1 predicted that disaggregating the financial statements will lead to a greater 
increase in jurors’ negligence judgments for individual investors than for institutional 
investors. However, there is no significant  Aggregation × Investor base interaction (p-
value= 0.915), thus H1 is not supported. H2 asserted that the difference between jurors’ 
negligence assessments for good, mixed, and bad AQIs will be greater when the financial 
statements are aggregated than when they are disaggregated. Unfortunately, there was no 
significant AQI × Aggregation interaction (p-value=0.878), thus H2 is not supported. H3 
suggests that negative (positive) AQIs will increase (decrease) jurors’ judgments of 
auditor negligence more when the company’s investor base consists primarily of 
individual investors than when it consists primarily of institutional investors, however 
there is no significant AQI × Investor base (p=0.228), thus H3 is not supported. Finally, 
H4 predicts the interaction found in H3to be stronger when the financial statements are 
aggregated. Unfortunately, there is no significant three way interaction (p-value=0.233), 
thus H4 is not supported. 
 The only significant effect on participant's assessments of auditor negligence 
appear to be a main effect of the audit quality indicators (p<.001). Jurors believed the 
auditor would be more likely to be found negligent when the audit quality indicators were 
bad as opposed to good (5.80 vs. 4.63, t=3.80, F=14.46, p<.001) or mixed (5.80 vs. 4.72, 
t=3.51, F=12.29, p=.001). They did not, however, feel the auditor would be more likely 
to be found negligent when the audit indicators were good as when they were mixed 
(4.63 vs. 4.72, t=0.28, F=0.08, p=.778). Thus, auditors are only held to be more negligent 





I conducted an experiment to examine the joint influence of AQIs, financial 
statement aggregation, and investor base, or jurors’ judgments of auditor negligence. My 
findings could provide insight for standard setters about consequences of mandatory AQI 
disclosure in a litigation setting. While practitioners have expressed concerns about AQIs 
generally increasing their risk of litigation, my results suggest that this is only a concern 
when the AQIs indicate a poorly performed audit. 
Like all empirical research, this study has limitations. There are a number of 
different factors that relate to the task, decision-maker, and legal environmental that I do 
not examine that could impact my findings. For example, future research could examine 
different AQIs, or examine their disclosure or lack of disclosure under different 
regulatory conditions. These or other facets of the task and environment could be fruitful 





THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT AGGREGATION, ESTIMATE 
UNCERTAINTY, AND MISSTATEMENT SIZE ON JUROR JUDGMENTS 
3.1 Introduction 
 In the United States, accounting standards require very little disaggregation of the 
income statement. As Libby and Emett (2014) point out, U.S. standards only require that 
operating expenses be broken into (1) cost of sales and (2) a single line-item for selling, 
general, and administrative expenses on the income statement, and (while some 
companies disaggregate these amounts considerably) many report them in this minimal 
way. Further, U.S. standards provide little guidance as to which expenses fall into each of 
these categories, and, without guidance, companies vary considerably in what they do 
and do not include within each of these line-items, even within the same industry (Libby 
& Emett, 2014). In contrast to the U.S., international accounting standards generally 
require more disaggregation of the income statement, although those rules allow 
companies significant discretion as well (IASB, 2009; Libby & Brown, 2013; SEC, 
2011). Chen, Miao, and Shevlin (2015) demonstrate archivally that there is a wide 
variance in the level of line-item aggregation or disaggregation in practice, and that more 
aggregation leads to larger analyst forecast errors. Libby and Brown (2013) demonstrate 
that auditors are less likely to correct misstatements when they are aggregated with other 
accounts into a single income statement line-item. Further, they show that there is little 
agreement among auditors about whether the aggregation or disaggregation of line-items 
matters to them, or about what professional standards require. Thus, managers could 
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potentially use aggregation to manipulate the appearance of a company in audited 
financial statements. 
 If auditors are less likely to correct misstatements that occur in aggregated income 
statement accounts (Libby & Brown, 2013), then aggregation potentially increases the 
risk of materially misstated financial statements with a clean audit opinion. In this paper, 
we investigate whether aggregation could simultaneously help protect auditors from 
exposure to the legal risks of uncorrected material misstatements. If so, then the lack of 
clear guidance in accounting and auditing standards on aggregation or disaggregation in 
income statements may ultimately allow more misstatements in audited financial 
statements while (ironically) also helping provide a critical gatekeeper (the auditor) with 
shelter from the legal costs of more misstatements in audited financial statements. 
Although this would be contrary to the normal intent of standard setters, U.S. standards 
are mostly silent on the issue of aggregation, and the few opinions that its standard setting 
body has offered on aggregation have been both positive and negative (e.g., FASB, 1979, 
1984; Libby & Emett, 2014).  
 I investigate the effect of income statement aggregation on jurors’ assessments of 
auditors following an uncorrected material misstatement in the financial statements that 
resulted in losses incurred by plaintiffs. I examine this in settings of uncorrected material 
misstatements related to accounting estimates of either high or low estimate uncertainty. 
Research has expressed concerns over high levels of estimate uncertainty unfairly 
increasing auditors’ litigation risks, especially when the amount of estimate uncertainty 
exceeds the size of alleged material misstatements (e.g., Christensen, Glover, & Wood, 
2012; Bell & Griffin, 2012). Using prior research and theory, I predict that the 
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combination of a material misstatement in a disaggregated income statement and low 
estimate uncertainty will lead jurors to increase the standard of care that they mentally 
hold auditors to for (failing to) detect and correct the material misstatement. This increase 
in the standard of care that auditors are held to, in turn, increases jurors’ assessments of 
the negligence of the auditors during their performance of the audit. An implication of 
my findings is that, by standard setters allowing a wide variance in the level of income 
statement aggregation in practice (Libby & Brown, 2013), higher levels of income 
statement aggregation can allow auditors to avoid legal exposure for failing to detect 
misstatements of low estimate uncertainty. 
Using an experiment, I find evidence supportive of my theory and hypotheses. 
Specifically, participants in the role of jurors read an experimental case of materially 
misstated financial statements that carried a clean audit opinion, and I manipulated the 
presentation of the income statement (more aggregated or more disaggregated) and the 
level of estimate uncertainty related to the misstatement (higher or lower). While the 
misstatement is material in all experimental conditions, I also manipulate the size of the 
material misstatement, to test my predictions under both conditions in which the range of 
estimate uncertainty is both smaller than and larger than the alleged material 
misstatement (Christensen et al., 2012). My findings suggest that the joint effect of 
aggregation and estimate uncertainty on jurors’ standard of care judgments and on their 
negligence judgments occur across both types of scenarios.  
My findings have implications for the small but growing literature on financial 
statement line-item aggregation and disaggregation. For example, prior research suggests 
negative effects of aggregation on auditors’ judgments (Libby & Brown, 2013), both 
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negative and positive effects on investors’ judgments (Elliott, Hobson, & White, 2015), 
and no effects of aggregation on experienced credit analysts’ judgments (Bloomfield, 
Hodge, Hopkins, & Rennekamp, 2015). My study examines the issue within an auditor 
litigation context and suggests that allowing aggregation may help shelter auditors from 
legal exposure due to uncorrected misstatements with inherently lower estimate 
uncertainty. 
My findings also have implications for the auditing literature on estimate 
uncertainty. Prior auditing research has expressed significant concern that requiring 
auditors to express an opinion on accounting estimates with wide-ranging estimate 
uncertainty potentially opens up auditors to unacceptably high litigation risks (e.g., 
Christensen et al., 2012; Bell & Griffin, 2012). In contrast, my study suggests that high 
estimate uncertainty may have the opposite effect on litigation risks under certain 
conditions. Specifically, jurors appear to recognize that auditors have less ability to 
accurately make valuations of inherently high estimate uncertainty. Furthermore, while 
jurors recognize that auditors should have more ability to detect low-uncertainty 
misstatements, they nevertheless hold auditors to a lower standard of care when the 
income statement is aggregated. Thus, once auditors are in litigation due to an undetected 
misstatement, high estimate uncertainty can potentially decrease (rather than increase) 
their litigation risks under common conditions. 
My findings also have implications for the literature on auditor negligence 
litigation. Across all of my experimental conditions, participants in my study believed 
that auditors had a uniformly high obligation to correct the material misstatement. Yet, 
whether they held auditors responsible for failing to do so depended on the joint effects 
33 
 
of aggregation and estimate uncertainty. This suggests a disconnect between jurors’ 
perceptions of auditors obligations and the extent to which they hold auditors responsible 
for failing to meet those obligations.  
Finally, these findings should be informative to standard setters. That is, standard 
setters have viewed income statement line-item aggregation as a generally harmless 
choice or, in some ways, even benign (Libby & Emett, 2014; Libby & Brown, 2013). 
Yet, aggregation may result in both an increased likelihood of uncorrected misstatements 
in audited financial statements and simultaneously reduced legal implications for some of 
those uncorrected material misstatements. Thus, standard setters’ current guidance level 
may carry spillover effects that they do not intend. 
3.2 Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 Financial Statement Aggregation and Disaggregation 
 Nearly all research on the aggregation or disaggregation of accounting 
information uses archival methods to focus on the level of disaggregation into different 
operating segments (i.e., “segment reporting”) in the financial statements, as opposed to 
the disaggregation of financial statement line-items (see Libby & Emett, 2014, for a 
review).3 However, recent archival work by Chen et al. (2015) focuses on line-item 
aggregation by examining its variance among U.S.-listed public companies by counting 
the number of non-missing items from financial statement subtotals in the Compustat 
                                                          
3 When firms disaggregate accounting information into fewer reporting segments, their reporting decision 
can be driven by a desire to present themselves opportunistically by burying segment losses or by a 
reluctance to reveal proprietary information about a profitable segment to competitors (e.g., Bens, Berger & 
Monahan, 2011; Berger & Hann, 2007; Botosan & Stanford, 2005). Users of financial statements generally 
benefit from more disaggregation into segment-level information (e.g., Berger & Hann, 2003; Ettredge, 
Kwon, Smith, & Zarowin, 2005). However, regulatory requirements that increase the level of this 




database. Consistent with Libby and Emett’s (2014) review, Chen et al. (2015) find wide 
variance in the level of line-item aggregation or disaggregation in practice. Furthermore, 
they find that aggregation in audited financial statements is correlated with larger analyst 
forecast errors and other indicators of lower transparency.   
 Experimental research has focused on the level of disaggregation of financial 
statement line-items. The existing body of research is small and presents mixed findings 
about whether and how aggregation or disaggregation of financial statement line-items 
influences users’ judgments. Libby and Brown (2013) show that auditors are less likely to 
correct misstatements when they are aggregated with other accounts into a single income 
statement line-item, suggesting that aggregation can lead to more material misstatements 
propagating into audited financial statements. In contrast, Bloomfield et al. (2015) do not 
find systematic effects of aggregation or disaggregation on the judgments of credit 
analysts. In that study, analysts were asked to analyze the financial statements of two 
companies and provide creditworthiness judgments. Information about relevant operating 
risks of the companies, however, were placed in two income statement accounts that 
either were or were not aggregated. When participants received financial statements 
disaggregating the relevant information, analysts’ ability to identify relevant operating 
risks depended on the location of the disaggregated information in the financial 
statements and the format of the financial statements. However, for the participants who 
received aggregated financial statements, their judgments were not systematically 
different from any of the participants who received disaggregated information, regardless 
of where it was presented or how the financial statements were formatted. Thus, 
35 
 
Bloomfield et al. (2015) caution standard setters that aggregation or disaggregation may 
not incrementally influence users’ judgments.  
Elliott et al. (2015) examine a laboratory market’s processing of earnings 
information that is either aggregated, disaggregated into persistent earnings components 
versus non-persistent earnings events, or consisting of persistent components only. While 
disaggregation generally improved market efficiency, long investors were more likely to 
erroneously interpret the disaggregated, non-persistent earnings events as evidence of 
persistent good news. Thus, the benefits of disaggregation may depend on the type of 
investor and their ability to incorporate the information into their judgments in a non-
biased manner. Finally, Bonner, Clor-Proell, and Koonce (2014) similarly suggest that 
the benefits or drawbacks of aggregation may depend on other factors. Using MBA 
students in the role of managers and in the role of investors, Bonner et al. (2014) provide 
evidence that managers aggregate losses and disaggregate gains in order to present the 
company in as favorable a light as possible, and that these aggregation and disaggregation 
presentation tactics, in turn, influence investors’ impressions of the company. Thus, 
whether investors would benefit most from aggregation or disaggregation depends on the 
nature of the gain or loss.  
 Overall, prior research suggests that whether and when financial statement users 
benefit from line-item disaggregation may depend on a variety of factors related to the 
task, judgment environment, and the decision maker. As Libby and Emett (2014) note, 
the research to date is small, and further research is warranted. While existing research 
suggests that line-item aggregation may increase the likelihood of the auditor allowing 
uncorrected misstatements into the financial statements (Libby & Brown, 2013), I focus 
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on the implications of aggregation on auditor’s responsibility for uncorrected 
misstatements. Next, I develop theory that juror judgments depend jointly on financial 
statement aggregation and estimate uncertainty.  
3.3.2 Estimate Uncertainty  
 Auditors are increasingly responsible to form opinions about valuation estimates 
for illiquid assets and liabilities for which observable market prices are unavailable and 
estimation techniques are fraught with uncertainty (e.g., Griffin, 2014). Recent research 
has focused on the difficulties that high levels of estimate uncertainty place on the audit 
profession. Auditors may not have the expertise to understand many complex estimates, 
and they may evaluate complex estimates using approaches more appropriate for 
verifying objective transactions (Griffith, Hammersly, & Kadous, 2015a). Improving the 
audit of complex estimates may require fundamental adjustments to the overall audit 
approach (Bell & Griffin, 2012; Griffith, Hammersly, Kadous & Young, 2015b). Of 
particular concern, some estimates come with ranges of uncertainty so large that they 
exceed materiality thresholds, and market participants may not recognize the especially 
difficult position that this places auditors in for undetected material misstatements that 
are within the range of estimate uncertainty (Christensen et al., 2012). As a result, 
researchers have expressed concern that high levels of estimate uncertainty may increase 
auditors’ litigation risk onerously, despite the level of uncertainty potentially being 
beyond the auditors’ ability to fully control (e.g., Christensen et al., 2012; Bell & Griffin, 
2012).  
While high levels of estimate uncertainty may increase the inherent risk of 
material misstatement in the financial statements (e.g., Griffith et al., 2015a), Griffin 
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(2014) finds that auditors generally respond to higher inherent uncertainty in 
management’s estimate by requiring more audit adjustments. Thus, the net effect of 
estimate uncertainty on actual auditor litigation is unclear. Recent archival evidence on 
estimate uncertainty and audit fees suggest that auditors price the audit under a belief that 
higher levels of estimate uncertainty overall tends to increase their litigation risks 
(Goncharov, Reidl, & Sellhorn, 2014). Furthermore, archival evidence suggests that 
higher estimate uncertainty strains the auditor-client relationship across a variety of 
measures, presumably reflecting a belief by auditors that estimate uncertainty increases 
their legal risks (Ayers, Neal, Reid, & Shipman, 2014). Thus, auditors appear to believe 
that high estimate uncertainty increases their own litigation risks by more than the effects 
of any offsetting changes to the audit approach that the uncertainty may prompt. 
3.2.3 Estimate Uncertainty, Income Statement Aggregation, and the Standard of 
Care  
While high estimate uncertainty may ultimately increase the probability of 
auditors entering into litigation, it remains an open question how high levels of estimate 
uncertainty will influence jurors’ judgments of auditors once they are in litigation. In this 
section, I use prior research and theory to predict that high estimate uncertainty can 
actually decrease (rather than increase) auditors’ litigation risks, depending on whether or 
not the misstatement is aggregated with other accounts in its income statement line-item, 
by affecting the standard of care that jurors hold auditors to. 
The standard of care that jurors hold auditors to is an important factor in jurors’ 
negligence judgments (Kadous, 2000; Maksymov & Nelson, 2014). It represents jurors’ 
mental representations of the level of work and care that a properly conducted audit 
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would have engaged in to detect material misstatements (Kadous, 2000). As Peecher and 
Piercey (2008) note, jurors are relative novices with auditing and accounting contexts and 
are at a tremendous disadvantage understanding and interpreting the ex ante sufficiency 
of specific aspects of audit work (e.g., appropriate sample sizes or hours budgeted to a 
task). As a result, jurors are unlikely to spontaneously form precise expectations about 
the quantity or nature of audit specific procedures that auditors should have performed ex 
ante to achieve a specific audit objective. Rather, jurors are more likely to form a more 
vague mental representation (cf. Wallsten, 1990) of whether a properly conducted audit 
would have prevented the material misstatement under the specific conditions of the case 
(cf. Kinney & Nelson, 1996; Kadous, 2000). The more that jurors believe that a properly 
conducted audit would have detected the material misstatement in a particular setting, the 
higher of a standard they are to holding auditors to for failing to do so. Thus, based on 
prior theory and research, I describe this vague mental representation of what a properly 
conducted audit would have done as juror’s standard of care. 
Peecher and Piercey (2008) suggest that jurors, lacking complete information and 
expertise to interpret the sufficiency of ex ante audit work on their own, will search for 
other cues to help them assess auditors. Specifically, jurors will attempt to interpret the 
incomplete information they have about the ex ante work done at the time of the audit by 
using attributes of the ex post material misstatement observed (Kadous, 2000; Peecher & 
Piercey, 2008).  
Aggregation or disaggregation is likely to be one such attribute of a material 
misstatement affecting jurors’ judgments. Holding the size of a material misstatement and 
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its other qualitative factors4 constant, a misstatement is likely to appear more salient 
when it appears on the income statement in its own account as a single line-item. In 
contrast, when the misstated account is aggregated with other (non-misstated) accounts 
into a single line-item, the impact of the misstatement should be diluted in the minds of 
jurors. As a result of this dilution effect (cf. Fanning, Agoglia, & Piercey, 2015), I expect 
that, ceteris paribus, a material misstatement will appear to jurors to have a larger 
(smaller) impact on the financial statements when its account is disaggregated from 
(aggregated with) other accounts in its income statement line-item.  
Thus, disaggregation of a material misstatement makes it appear more salient. 
However, as I discuss next, the impact of disaggregation on jurors’ judgments of auditors 
likely depends on the level of inherent estimate uncertainty surrounding the misstatement.  
There are at least two possible viewpoints for predicting how jurors will react to 
high levels of estimate uncertainty. Under one view, jurors learning that there was high 
estimate uncertainty surrounding an undetected misstatement will hold the auditor more 
culpable for not being more careful and expressing an incorrect audit opinion when there 
was high estimate uncertainty. This viewpoint would not expect jurors to recognize that 
estimate uncertainty is driven by environmental and chance factors beyond the auditor’s 
control, and that lower levels of estimate uncertainty (not higher levels) imply that the 
auditor was remiss in failing to detect it. This is a somewhat naïve model of juror 
judgment because it assumes that jurors will react negatively to estimate uncertainty out 
of a generalized dislike of uncertainty and ambiguity, regardless of the source of the 
                                                          
4 Other qualitative factors affecting the materiality of a misstatement include whether the misstatement is 
necessary to meet earnings benchmarks or analysts’ expectations (SEC, 1999). 
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uncertainty, and that jurors are unable to make attributions of a failure to alternative 
causes.  
In contrast to this viewpoint, jurors do not necessarily attribute the causes of 
failures to factors within the defendant’s control, and recognize the presence and role of 
uncertainty in making these attributions (Curley, 2007), consistent with psychology’s 
generalized characterizations of individuals as boundedly rational. According to 
Attribution Theory, individuals placed into the position of evaluating performance after 
an observed failure (e.g., a material misstatement) attempt to attribute the failure to 
internal causes, relational causes, or external causes, searching for appropriate cues 
(Eberly et al., 2011; Burton et al., 2014). In my setting, internal causes of an undetected 
material misstatement would be the result of factors within the auditor’s control (e.g., 
insufficient audit effort), relational causes arise from interactions between the auditor and 
management (e.g., auditor independence problems), and external causes would be the 
result of factors not controllable by auditors. Furthermore, to the extent that individuals 
are unable to clearly attribute the cause of a failure to internal causes, relational causes, or 
external causes, they tend not to attribute the cause anywhere, instead holding “belief in 
reserve” (e.g., Shafer, 1976; Macchi, Osherson & Krantz, 1999). This behavior has been 
demonstrated among jurors (Curley, 2007). 
When evaluating the performance of auditors following an undetected material 
misstatement, jurors are likely to form vague representations of what the auditors should 
have been able to do to prevent the material misstatement had they conducted the audit 
properly (i.e., standard of care). Disaggregating a material misstatement (holding its size 
constant) will generally make it appear more glaring and give jurors a stronger sense that 
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the error negatively impacts the financial statements. However, in the process of 
determining whether a properly conducted audit should have been able to uncover the 
misstatement, jurors will search for cues that allow them to attribute the failure to 
internal, external, or relational causes. Although high levels of estimate uncertainty may 
indeed increase the auditors’ risk of being brought into litigation due to undetected 
misstatements (Bell & Griffin, 2012; Christensen et al., 2012), once in court, high 
estimate uncertainty provides a means for jurors to attribute the failure to causes external 
to the auditors. Furthermore, to the extent that high estimate uncertainty makes jurors 
uncertain as to where to assign their attributions, they are likely to retain more belief in 
reserve (Schafer, 1976). Either way, higher external attributions or belief in reserve make 
jurors less likely to attribute the cause of the misstatement to factors directly within the 
auditors’ control (e.g., internal or relational causes). 
In contrast, when the misstatement is related to an estimate of low inherent 
uncertainty, the jurors are unable to find external explanations for attributing the failure 
and feel more comfortable unambiguously assigning blame to auditors. Thus, a 
disaggregated misstatement may appear so glaring that on the surface it appears that the 
auditors should have been able to prevent it; however, jurors are less likely to determine 
that the auditors should have been able to prevent it when its related inherent estimate 
uncertainty is high. The less jurors believe that a properly conducted audit would have 
been able to prevent a material misstatement, the lower the standard of care they are 
effectively holding auditors to for failing to correct the misstatement.  
This leads to the following expectations. First, when a material misstatement is 
disaggregated from other accounts in its own line item and stems from an estimate of 
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inherently low uncertainty, jurors will hold auditors to a relatively high standard of care. 
In contrast, if the disaggregated misstatement stems from inherently high estimate 
uncertainty, jurors will hold auditors to a relatively lower standard of care, since the high 
estimate uncertainty provides an external source of uncertainty to attribute the accounting 
failure towards. When material misstatements are aggregated with other non-misstated 
accounts into one line-item, jurors will hold auditors to a relatively lower standard of 
care, since that has the effect of making the material misstatement less salient and less 
impactful.  High or low estimate uncertainty will be less likely to incrementally impact 
aggregated misstatements, since those misstatements appear less salient, reducing the 
jurors’ need to search for other external attributions for the misstatement. This suggests 
the following ordinal interaction of disaggregation of a material misstatement and 
estimate uncertainty on jurors’ standard of care: 
H1: Jurors will hold auditors to a relatively high standard of care for a 
disaggregated material misstatement of lower estimate uncertainty, and 
jurors will hold auditors to a relatively lower standard of care when the 
material misstatement is aggregated with other financial statement line-
items, when estimate uncertainty is high, or both.  
An important implication of these predictions is that auditors will face a relatively 
lower standard of care from jurors for failing to detect a material misstatement in the 
financial statements when it is more aggregated with other financial statement accounts. 
Thus, income statement aggregation can both make auditors less likely to correct 
misstatements (Libby & Brown, 2013), and yet simultaneously provide them shelter from 
litigation risk for failing to do so when estimate uncertainty is low.  
As stated previously, jurors are likely to form a vague mental representation of 
what a properly conducted audit should have been able to do (i.e., standard of care) in an 
attempt to help them assess auditor negligence. Jurors’ standard of care judgments are 
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likely to impact their negligence judgments (Kadous, 2000). That is, jurors attempt to 
compare what should have happened to what did happen, and the more that a properly 
conducted audit should have prevented a material misstatement (i.e., the higher the 
standard of care), the more jurors will hold auditors negligent for failing to detect the 
misstatement. Thus, I expect that the interactive effect of aggregation and estimate 
uncertainty predicted for jurors’ standard of care for auditors in H1 will, in turn, also 
influence jurors’ judgments of auditor negligence. Stated formally: 
H2: The joint effect of disaggregation and low estimate uncertainty on jurors’ 
standard of care (H1) will, in turn, influence jurors’ judgments of auditor 




 Following prior research (e.g., Grenier, Pomeroy, & Stern, 2014; Grenier, 
Pomeroy, & Reffett, 2012; Kadous & Mercer, 2012; Peecher & Piercey, 2008), we 
recruited undergraduate students enrolled in a very large sophomore-level introductory 
accounting course as participants in my study. Meta-analyses of prior research on jurors 
indicate that undergraduates’ judgments are similar to those of jurors across different task 
factors and contexts (Bornstein, 1999; Zickafoose & Bornstein, 1999). This similarity in 
the judgments of undergraduates and broader pools of juror-eligible adults has been 
replicated in accounting studies on auditor negligence litigation (e.g., Cornell, Warne, & 
Eining, 2009; Grenier et al., 2014; Kadous, 2001).5 Students in introductory accounting 
generally have enough basic understanding of financial statements and their purpose to 
understand the task, similar to the basic understanding that jurors would receive during an 
                                                          
5 Under these conditions, Libby et al. (2002), Peecher and Solomon (2001), Kadous and Mercer (2012), and 
Bonner et al. (2014) suggest that students are appropriate participants.  
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extended trial, and yet they are still relative novices and have no experience making audit 
decisions, also similar to jurors (Kadous & Mercer, 2012; Peecher & Piercey, 2008).6 
My sample consists of 433 participants, 44.5 percent of whom were female. 
Participants received extra course credit for putting in a reasonable amount of effort. On 
average, participants had completed 2.48 years of post-high school education, 1.68 
accounting classes, and 4.11 management, accounting, and/or economics college courses. 
3.3.2 Experimental Design 
 My experiment uses a 2 × 2 × 2 between-subjects experimental design. My three 
manipulated experimental factors are: (1) the aggregation of the income statement 
numbers (more aggregated vs. more disaggregated), (2) the level of subjective estimate 
uncertainty involved in the accounting loss that yielded the alleged material misstatement 
(high vs. low), and (3) the alleged misstatement size (larger vs. smaller). The 
misstatement size manipulation allows us to test H1 and H2 in conditions when the 
material misstatement is outside the range of uncertainty as well as when it is within the 
range of uncertainty, since the latter scenario has been of particular interest to accounting 
research and others concerned about auditor liability (e.g., Christensen et al., 2012; Bell 
& Griffin, 2012). This manipulation allows us to test the robustness of my predictions for 
both settings (e.g., Bowlin, Hobson, & Piercey, 2015). I delivered the experimental 
instrument to participants online, using Qualtrics® software, which randomly assigned 
them to experimental conditions. 
 
 
                                                          
6 Using a large introductory accounting class also gives us a sample that spans 29 undergraduate majors. 
Nineteen percent of the participants indicated that they intend to major in accounting. An intention to major 
in accounting has no significant effects on my results (cf. Peecher and Solomon 2001; Libby et al. 2002). 
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3.3.3 Task and Manipulations 
 Participants read a legal case as jurors. I designed my experimental materials 
based on instruments from prior research (Kadous, 2000, 2001; Peecher & Piercey, 
2008), adapted and customized for my hypotheses, manipulations, and measures of 
interest. My experimental materials were reviewed by four lawyers who had a combined 
38 years of legal experience (including a former law school dean and a United States 
District Court clerk), in order to ensure that the information presented would be both 
realistic and admissible in court. 
The case materials began by giving participants a basic understanding of the 
auditing concepts (e.g., audit opinions and reasonable assurance) similar to that which 
jurors would receive during a trial, adapted from Peecher and Piercey (2008).7 The case 
then proceeded with details about the audit of a gravel and cement company, Big Time 
Gravel, performed by the accounting firm Jones & Company, adapted from Kadous 
(2000, 2001). Before my manipulations of estimate uncertainty and misstatement size, the 
case first described how the company’s mining machinery is a critical portion of the 
company, and how the company must recognize an “impairment loss” (which reduces 
reported earnings) if the market value of the machinery is substantially less than what is 
stated on the company’s books. Furthermore, Big Time Gravel’s mining machinery is 
extremely customized to their mines, quarries, and processing sites, and therefore is not 
regularly bought and sold on an open market, and so does not have readily available 
                                                          
7 Specifically, following Peecher and Piercey (2008), the beginning of the instrument (1) advised 
participants that they would be asked review questions about case material (to encourage attention), (2) 
explained fundamental auditing concepts (such as material misstatements, materiality, “clean” audit 
opinions, reasonable assurance versus absolute assurance, negligence, audit procedures, and the 
consequences of undetected material misstatements), and (3) asked related review questions, with the 
opportunity for participants to look back at what they read. 
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market prices. Instead, Big Time Gravel uses a mathematical model to estimate the fair 
value of the machinery. 
In the high (low) estimate uncertainty conditions, the case told participants that 
the model is based on highly subjective (objective) and very complicated 
(straightforward) assumptions about the cash that the machinery will generate, as well as 
other difficult (simple) projections about the rather unpredictable (predictable) future 
costs of operating the machinery. In all conditions, the company recorded the value of the 
machinery at $545 million, resulting in a $10 million impairment loss. However, in the 
high (low) estimate uncertainty conditions, because of the high (low) levels of 
uncertainty in these inputs, the auditors believe the value of the machinery to be 
somewhere between $350 million and $650 million ($450 million and $550 million). 
This manipulation holds the midpoint of the auditor’s estimate range constant at $500 
million, and simply varies the width of the range. In all conditions, the company’s value 
of the machinery of $545 million is within the auditor’s reasonable estimate range, and so 
Jones & Company concluded that the account was not materially misstated, without 
requiring adjustment. 
 Next, all participants read about an alleged misstatement in the value of the 
machinery and a subsequent lawsuit. After audited financial statements (with the 
auditors’ clean opinion) were issued, the company’s mining machinery encountered 
problems, which created high costs of both repair and lost revenue while the machinery 
was down. Investors sued Big Time Gravel, alleging that the condition of the machinery 
should have been apparent to the auditors during the audit of the financial statements. In 
the larger (smaller) misstatement size conditions, expert witnesses testified that the true 
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value of the machinery should have been $255 million ($495 million), reflecting an 
overstatement in the value of the machinery by $290 million ($50 million), and an 
understatement of the impairment loss by the same amount. While this manipulation 
varies the magnitude of the material misstatements, in both conditions, the misstatements 
are material. Specifically, both misstatements exceed 0.5% of sales, a common 
quantitative materiality benchmark used in practice (Eilifsen & Messier, 2015; Ayers et 
al. 2015), and the case informed all participants that the alleged misstatement allowed 
Big Time Gravel to meet (rather than miss) analysts’ earnings targets of $1.28 per share, 
a situation which always makes a misstatement material (SEC, 1999).  
 For my misstatement size manipulation, I chose a relatively strong manipulation 
of large versus small misstatements for the following reasons. First, the purpose of this 
manipulation is to test the robustness of my hypothesized effects under conditions of both 
larger and smaller material misstatements. As a robustness test, I wanted a strong 
manipulation that would maximize systematic differences between the two conditions, so 
as to increase the chances of detecting any systematic differences in my hypothesized 
effects within larger and smaller misstatement conditions, if any such differences occur 
(Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Second, I wanted the larger (smaller) misstatement to be 
completely outside (inside) of the auditor’s estimate range for all participants, regardless 
of whether they were in the high or low estimate uncertainty conditions. This allows a 
cleaner test of the effects of misstatement size, without making a particular misstatement 
size outside of the auditor’s range in one level of estimate uncertainty and inside the 
auditors range in the other level of estimate uncertainty. Thus, the implications of the 
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misstatement being either inside or outside of the auditor’s range of uncertainty are held 
constant within each level of misstatement size. 
 In all conditions, the plaintiffs allege that, without the misstatement causing the 
company to meet analysts’ earnings targets, they would not have remained invested in the 
company and therefore would not have incurred their subsequent losses. Participants then 
received an excerpt from Big Time Gravel’s income statement, with columns showing 
the numbers as reported in the audited financial statements, the numbers as the investors’ 
expert witnesses testified that they should have been reported, and the size of the alleged 
misstatements, in both absolute and percentage terms. The financial statements were 
manipulated so that the materially misstated account (impairment loss on machinery) 
either appeared as its own line-item, or was aggregated with other accounts as a single 
line-item. I designed my disaggregated condition following the disaggregated income 
statement in FASB (2010, 118) closely, with only minimal adaptations to my study. 
Appendix A shows examples of the aggregated and disaggregated conditions.  
3.3.4 Dependent Variables 
 After reviewing the financial statements, participants made several judgments 
related to the Jones & Company audit of Big Time Gravel. The primary dependent 
variable for testing my theory is the standard of care that jurors hold the Jones & 
Company auditors to. That is, the more that jurors believe a properly conducted audit 
could have prevented a material misstatement, the higher of a standard they are holding 
the Jones & Company audit to for detecting (or, in this case, not detecting) the 
misstatement. Accordingly, I measure participants’ perceptions that a properly conducted 
audit could have correctly valued the machinery and its related impairment loss on a scale 
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from 1 to 10, and label this dependent variable as jurors’ standard of care for Jones & 
Company. H1 predicts that aggregation and estimate uncertainty will jointly influence 
jurors’ standard for what a properly conducted audit could have detected. 
 The secondary dependent variable for testing my theory is my participants’ 
perceptions of auditor negligence. My theory suggests that jurors will judge Jones & 
Company’s negligence based on how their audit (which failed to detect the misstatement) 
compares to the standard of care they hold Jones & Company to (i.e., the extent to which 
a properly conducted audit could have detected it). I measure participants’ perceptions 
that Jones & Company was negligent in failing to accurately assess the impairment loss 
on a scale from 1 to 10. Finally, I gathered additional supplementary measures and 
manipulation checks, as well as demographic data.  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Comprehension and Manipulation Checks 
 Participants responded to five questions that tested their understanding of the 
definitions of materiality, clean audit opinions, reasonable (vs. absolute) assurance, as 
well as implications of negligence and undetected misstatements. Performance on 
individual test items ranged from 96.1% (414 correct out of 431) to 99.5% (429 correct 
out of 431), significantly greater than chance (all p’s < 0.001). Thus, the instrument 
appeared to be successful in giving participants an understanding of new auditing 
concepts at a level comparable to reasonably attentive jurors.  
To check my manipulation of estimate uncertainty, my post-experimental 
questionnaire asked participants to rate the level of estimate uncertainty surrounding the 
inputs, assumptions, and estimation of the valuation model used by Big Time Gravel to 
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estimate the fair market value of the machinery (perceived uncertainty), on a scale from 1 
to 10. Participants’ perceived uncertainty ratings were significantly higher in the high 
estimate uncertainty conditions than in the low estimate uncertainty conditions (7.33 vs. 
6.66, t = 3.41, p < 0.001). In addition, I measured participants’ perceptions of the 
auditors’ ability to correctly estimate the value of the machinery and its impairment loss 
(perceived estimate ability, again on a scale from 1 to 10), since auditors should be less 
able to estimate correctly given high estimate uncertainty. Participants’ perceived 
estimate ability ratings were significantly lower in the high estimate uncertainty 
conditions than in the low estimate uncertainty conditions (5.42 vs. 5.83, t = −2.11, p = 
0.018). My manipulation of estimate uncertainty appears to be successful. 
To check my manipulation of misstatement size, I gathered three measures of the 
materiality of the alleged misstatement, expecting that participants would perceive the 
misstatement to have a more material impact when the misstatement was larger than 
when it was smaller. Specifically, participants assessed how much the alleged 
misstatement would impact the judgment and decision making of a reasonable person 
relying on the financial statements (materiality—judgment), how much the alleged 
misstatement impacts its income statement line-item (materiality—line-item), and how 
much it impacts the financial statements as a whole (materiality—fs-whole), on scales 
from 1 to 10. Participants’ ratings of materiality—judgment, materiality—line-item, and 
materiality—fs-whole were each significantly higher in the larger misstatement 
conditions than in the lower misstatement conditions (7.37 vs. 6.17, t = 5.95, p < 0.001; 
7.32 vs. 6.70; t = 3.71, p < 0.001; and 7.09 vs. 6.04, t = 5.52, p < 0.001; respectively).  
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I also included the materiality measures to serve as a check of my aggregation 
manipulation, and, in particular, materiality—line-item. Specifically, holding the size of 
the misstatement constant, I would expect participants to find that the misstatement has a 
larger impact on its income statement line-item when the misstated account appears by 
itself on the income statement than when it is aggregated with other accounts into one 
line-item. Furthermore, I would expect participants to believe that this impact on the 
financial statement line-item (materiality—line-item) would, in turn, impact the financial 
statements as a whole (materiality—fs-whole), as well as the judgment of a reasonable 
person relying on those financial statements (materiality—judgment). My findings are 
supportive of my manipulations. Besides the main effect of misstatement size, the only 
other statistically significant effect on my three materiality measures is a main effect of 
aggregation. Specifically, participants judged the impact of a misstatement to be larger 
when the misstated account was by itself as a line-item than when it was aggregated with 
other accounts. Participants’ ratings of materiality—line-item, materiality—fs-whole, and 
materiality—judgment were all significantly lower in the aggregated conditions than in 
the disaggregated conditions (6.38 vs. 7.34, t = 3.95, p < 0.001; 6.35 vs. 6.79, t = 2.31, p 
= 0.011; and 6.42 vs. 7.11, t = 3.40, p < 0.001; respectively). Moreover, in untabulated 
mediation analyses, I find that the effect of aggregation on materiality—line-item fully 
mediates the effect of aggregation on materiality—judgment and materiality—fs-whole.8 
Thus, overall, manipulation checks are consistent with misstatement size directly 
influencing all three materiality measures, and aggregation influencing perceptions of 
                                                          
8 I obtain statistically similar findings for mediation tests based on structural equation modeling, regression 
approaches, bootstrapping procedures, the Goodman test, the Sobel test, the Aroian test, or the traditional 
Baron-and-Kenny causal-steps approach procedures (Wang & Wang, 2012; Baron & Kenny, 1986; 




materiality via its effect on the aggregated line-item. My manipulations appear to have 
been successful. 
3.4.2 Hypothesis Tests 
3.4.2.1 Descriptive statistics for Standard of Care (H1). 
Table 3.1, Panels A and B shows descriptive statistics and an ANOVA for the 
standard of care that participants are holding the Jones & Company auditors to (i.e., 
participants’ ratings of the extent to which a properly conducted audit could have 
detected the alleged misstatement, on a scale from 1 to 10). The more that a properly 
conducted audit could have detected a misstatement, the higher the standard of care 
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   st. dev. (n)  2.09 (52) 2.39 (52) 
 
2.32 (53) 2.29 (55) 
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(107) Disaggregated 





   st. dev. (n) 2.27 (53) 1.72 (52) 
 
2.25 (52) 1.77 (56) 
 
2.26 (105) 1.74 
(108)  
 





Square F p 
 Estimate uncertainty 19.73 1 19.73 4.27 0.039 
 Misstatement size 20.00 1 20.00 4.33 0.019 b 
Aggregation 2.51 1 2.51 0.54 0.461 
 Estimate uncertainty × misstatement size 5.84 1 5.84 1.27 0.261 
 Aggregation × estimate uncertainty 13.05 1 13.05 2.83 0.047 b 
Aggregation × misstatement size < 0.01 1 < 0.01 0.00 0.984 
 Three-way interaction 0.63 1 0.63 0.14 0.711 
 Error 1,924.58 417 4.62 
    





Square F p 
 Ordinal interaction contrast (+3, −1, −1, 
−1) c 
31.29 1 31.29 6.78 0.005 b 
Misstatement size 20.00 1 20.00 4.33  0.019 b 
Residual between-cells effects 10.14 5 2.03 0.44 0.821 
  
Panel D: Supplemental simple effects tests 
 
Simple effect    T p 
 Effect of aggregation on standard of care given lower estimate 
uncertainty 
−1.72 0.043 b 
Effec  of aggregation on standard of care given higher estimate 
uncertainty 
0.66 0.507 
 Effec  of lower estimate uncertainty on standard of care given 
disaggregation 
2.65 0.004 b 






Table 3.1, Continued 
Standard of Care 
Notes: 
a The overall means in Panel A collapsed across misstatement size are the least-squares 
means of the significant estimate uncertainty × misstatement size interaction shown in 
Panel B (p = 0.047). Because misstatement size does not interact significantly with either 
aggregation or estimate uncertainty (p’s ≥ 0.261, Panel B), results within each 
misstatement size condition in Panel A are statistically similar to those collapsed across 
misstatement size in Panel A (e.g., Bowlin et al., 2015). The only systematic difference is 
that stan dard of care judgments are higher for larger undetected material 
misstatements than for smaller undetected material misstatements (i.e., the main effect of 
misstatement size in Panel B, p = 0.019).  
 
b These tests show significant effects with directional expectations, and therefore are the 
one-tailed p-values of the t-tests associated with the F-statistic, as applicable (e.g., 
Kachelmeier & Williamson, 2010, Bowlin et al., 2015). The remaining p-values represent 
two-tailed t-tests.  
 
c This contrast test assigns contrast weights of +3 to the low estimate 
uncertainty/disaggregated conditions, and −1 to the low estimate uncertainty/aggregated 
conditions, the high estimate uncertainty/aggregated conditions, and the high estimate 






 As expected, there is a positive main effect of misstatement size on standard of 
care such that auditors are held to a higher standard of care when the misstatement is 
larger than when it is smaller (6.59 vs. 6.16, t = 2.08, F = 4.33 in Table 3.1, Panel B, p = 
0.019). In addition, I observe a statistically significant aggregation × estimate uncertainty 
interaction (F = 2.83, p = 0.047; Table 3.1, Panel B). The statistical significance of this 
interaction is consistent with my formal test of H1, which follows. Figure 3.1 shows the 
means for this interaction. There are no significant interactions in the ANOVA involving 
misstatement size in my ANOVA table (Table 3.1, Panel B). This indicates that (besides 
the main effect of misstatement size), the aggregation × estimate uncertainty interaction 
pictured in Figure 3.1 is statistically similar across the larger and smaller misstatement 
size conditions (e.g., Bowlin et al. 2015). 
 
Figure 3.1 















3.4.2.2 Tests of H1. 
 H1 predicts that jurors will hold auditors to a relatively high standard of care for a 
disaggregated material misstatement of lower estimate uncertainty, and to a relatively lower 
standard of care when the material misstatement is aggregated with other financial statement 
line-items, when estimate uncertainty is high, or both. Following Buckless and Ravenscroft 
(1990), I test for this expected ordinal interaction using custom contrast weights of +3 for the 
disaggregated/low estimate uncertainty conditions and −1 for the remaining conditions (Figure 
3.1).9 The test result is statistically significant (t = 2.60, p = 0.005; Table 3.1 Panel C). In 
addition, I test whether the +3, −1, −1, −1 test of my expected aggregation × estimate 
uncertainty ordinal interaction and the expected main effect of misstatement size together explain 
effectively all of the between-cells variance within my experiment by examining the significance 
of the residual model variance (Buckless & Ravenscroft, 1990). My findings indicate the 
remaining between-cells variance is statistically insignificant (semi-omnibus F = 0.44 < 1; Table 
3.1 Panel C).10 This suggests that the +3, −1, −1, −1 ordinal interaction and the misstatement size 
main effect provide a good statistical fit for participants’ standard of care judgments and 
together explain effectively all of the systematic between-cells effects within this dependent 
variable. 
 
                                                          
9 These contrast weights reflect the expectation based on my theory that the best ex ante case for an effect of 
aggregation reducing standard of care judgments is when estimate uncertainty is low, since higher estimate 
uncertainty makes the auditors’ task inherently more difficult and should result in lower standard of care judgments 
anyway. 
10 Bayesian statistical techniques can provide an affirmative test that the cells assigned weights of −1 are equal to 
one another (i.e., there is no residual between-cells variance), rather than just the lack of disconfirming evidence that 
comes from failing to reject the null hypothesis that they are equal to one another (Bolstad, 2007; Kass & Raftery, 
1995), as the semi-omnibus F-test does. These Bayesian analyses indicate that, after controlling for the main effect 
of information on standard of care judgments, the cells assigned weights of −1 are statistically equal to one another 
(all BF10’s ≤ 0.16; BFInclusion’s ≤ 0.10; Kass & Raftery, 1995). 
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3.4.2.3 Supplementary analyses related to H1 
I test the simple effects of the aggregation × estimate uncertainty interaction on standard 
of care in Panel D of Table 3.1, and find that they are consistent with my theory and 
expectations. Aggregation significantly reduces standard of care when there is low estimate 
uncertainty (6.34 vs. 6.84 in Figure 3.1, t = −1.72, p = 0.043), but has no effect when there is 
high estimate uncertainty (6.26 vs. 6.06 in Figure 3.1, t = 0.66, p = 0.507). As a result, the 
decrease in standard of care judgments caused by aggregation is significantly larger within the 
low estimate uncertainty conditions than within the high estimate uncertainty conditions (F = 
2.83 in 3.1, t = 1.68, p = 0.047). I find that, when the income statement is disaggregated, 
participants’ standard of care ratings are significantly higher in the low estimate uncertainty 
conditions than in the high estimate uncertainty conditions (6.84 vs. 6.06 in Figure 3.1, t = 2.65, 
p = 0.004). However, there is no significant difference between the low and high estimate 
uncertainty conditions when the financial statements are aggregated (6.34 vs. 6.26 in Figure 3.1, 
t = 0.27, p = 0.785). These results are consistent with my formal tests of H1.  
3.4.2.4 Tests of H2 
H2 predicts that the joint effect of aggregation and estimate uncertainty on standard of 
care will, in turn, influence participants’ negligence judgments. This type of hypothesis is tested 
by testing the statistical significance of the indirect path from aggregation × estimate uncertainty 
to standard of care to negligence, depicted in Figure 3.2. Such a test does not simply confirm 
that standard of care and negligence are bivariately correlated, but rather that the entire path is 
significant (i.e., variance in negligence is explained specifically by the variance in standard of 
care that is explained by aggregation × estimate uncertainty).  
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As shown in the structural equation model in Figure 3.2, the aggregation × estimate 
uncertainty ordinal interaction influences standard of care (H1), and this variance in standard of 
care (depicted in Figure 3.1) subsequently influences negligence judgments. Goodness-of-fit 
indices indicate that the structural equation model in Figure 3.2 provides an excellent fit to the 
data (e.g., Root Mean Square Error of Approximation < 0.001; CFI and Tucker-Lewis Index > 





Aggregation × Estimate Uncertainty Ordinal Interaction, Misstatement Size, Standard of Care, and Negligence 
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Direct effect (after controlling for mediator): c′1 = 0.178, p = 0.159c 
 




Figure 3.2, Continued 












Path from 3, −1, −1, −1 Aggregation × 
Estimate Uncertainty ordinal 
interaction to Standard of Care to 
Negligence (i.e., a1 × b) 
H2 + 0.168 
95% of bootstrapped 
estimates > 0.075  
Significant 
Path from 3, −1, −1, −1 Misstatement Size 
to Standard of Care to Negligence (i.e., 
a2 × b) 
 + 0.114 
95% of bootstrapped 





a Goodness-of-fit indices indicate that the model produces an excellent fit to the data (e.g.; Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation < 0.001; Comparative Fit Index and Tucker-Lewis Index > 0.999; Weighted Root Mean Square Residual = 
0.023; see Brown 2014). The path coefficients a1, a2, b, c′1 and c′2 are consistent with standard Baron and Kenny (1983) 
mediation notation, and represent the same concepts. 
 
b This model uses weights of 3, −1, −1, −1 to test the expected aggregation × estimate uncertainty ordinal interaction. I obtain 
statistically similar results and fit when we use a structural equation model with the conventional aggregation × estimate 
uncertainty ordinal interaction and its constituent main effects as covariates. 
 
c As this figure shows, the effect of the aggregation × estimate uncertainty ordinal interaction on negligence judgments (Table 
3.2) appears to be fully mediated by standard of care. Specifically, holding the size of the misstatement constant, aggregation 
of that misstatement with other accounts reduces its perceived impact on its income-statement line-item, which, in turn, drives 
its perceived impact on the financial statements as a whole and on the judgment of a reasonable person relying on the financial 
statements, consistent with H2. Results in this model are suggestive of full mediation. Specifically, the total effect (i.e., not 
controlling for the mediator) of the ordinal interaction on Negligence is statistically significant (p = 0.005, Table 3.2 Panel C), 





d Standard of care also appears to mediate the effect of Misstatement Size on Negligence. As this figure shows, a larger 
misstatement increases the standard of care of auditors, which increases negligence judgments. Results of this model are 
consistent with partial mediation. That is, the total effect of Misstatement Size on Negligence (i.e., not controlling for the 
mediator) is statistically significant (p < 0.005, Table 3.2 Panels B and C), and, while the mediating path is statistically 
significant (i.e., bootstrapping test of the indirect, mediating path, a2 × b, is significant, above), the direct path (c′2) remains 




To formally test H2, I examine whether the product of coefficients a1 × b in my 
structural model (Figure 3.2) is significantly positive. If it is, then the entire path from the 
ordinal interaction to standard of care to negligence is statistically significant, and the 
total effect of the total effect of the aggregation × estimate uncertainty ordinal 
interaction on negligence is significantly mediated by standard of care (Hayes, 2009, 
2013). This test is most reliably done using bootstrapping procedures, which make no 
underlying assumptions about the distributional properties of the data (Hayes, 2009, 
2013). In these procedures, I drew 5,000 random subsamples of my data, computing the 
coefficients a1 and b for each subsample, and determining whether their product is 
positive at least 95% of the time (Hayes, 2009, 2013). I find that the model estimate for 
the indirect path (a1 × b) is 0.168, and 95% of the bootstrapped estimates > 0.075 (a 
confidence interval that does not contain zero and therefore is statistically significant). I 
obtain statistically similar results if we use the conventional ANOVA interaction term for 
the aggregation × estimate uncertainty ordinal interaction, rather than the +3, −1, −1, −1 
contrast weights used in Figure 3.2. I also obtain statistically similar findings regardless 
of whether we test H2 using Baron-and-Kenny causal steps approaches, the Sobel test, 
the Goodman test, and Aroian test, or bootstrapping procedures, within either a linear 
regression or a structural equation modeling framework (Wang & Wang, 2012; Baron & 
Kenny, 1986; MacKinnon et al., 1995; Hayes, 2013; Iacobucci, Saldanha, & Deng, 
2007). Thus, I find strong evidence that the effects described in H1 go on to influence 





3.4.2.5 Supplementary analyses related to H2 
Supplementary analysis of participants’ negligence judgments suggests that the 
indirect path tested in H2 results in negligence judgments that occur in a similar pattern 
as standard of care judgments. Descriptive statistics and ANOVA results for negligence 








Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
























        Aggregated 





   st. dev. (n)  1.82 (52) 2.02 (53) 
 
1.99 (54) 2.09 (55) 
 
1.90 (106) 2.05 
(108) Disaggregated 





   st. dev. (n) 2.21 (53) 1.77 (54) 
 
1.78 (52) 1.99 (56) 
 
1.99 (105) 1.88 
(110)  





Square F p 
 Estimate uncertainty 0.05 1 0.05 0.01 0.910 
 Misstatement size 78.80 1 78.80 20.44 < 0.001 b 
Aggregation 26.76 1 26.76 6.94 0.009 
 Estimate uncertainty × misstatement size 0.05 1 0.05 0.01 0.909 
 Aggregation × estimate uncertainty 11.83 1 11.83 3.07 0.040 b 
Aggregation × misstatement size 0.46 1 0.46 0.12 0.729 
 Three-way interaction 1.53 1 1.53 0.40 0.530 
 Error 1,623.12 421 3.86 
  
  





Square F p 
 Ordinal interaction contrast (+3, −1, −1, 
−1) c 
26.46 1 26.46 6.86 0.005 b 
Misstatement size 78.80 1 78.80 20.44 < 0.001 b 
Residual between-cells effects 15.16 5 3.03 0.79 0.560 
  
Panel D: Supplemental simple effects tests 
 
Simple effect    T p 
 Effect of aggregation on negligence given lower estimate uncertainty −3.13 0.002 b 
Effect of aggregation on negligence given higher estimate uncertainty −0.62 0.536 
 Effect of lower estimate uncertainty on negligence given disaggregation 1.32 0.094 b 




Table 3.2, Continued 
Notes: 
a The overall means in Panel A collapsed across misstatement size are the least-squares 
means of the significant estimate uncertainty × misstatement size interaction shown in 
Panel B (p = 0.040). Because misstatement size does not interact significantly with either 
aggregation or estimate uncertainty (p’s ≥ 0.530, Panel B), results within each 
misstatement size condition in Panel A are statistically similar to those collapsed across 
misstatement size in Panel A (e.g., Bowlin et al., 2015). The only systematic difference is 
that negligence judgments are higher for larger undetected material misstatements than 
for smaller undetected material misstatements (i.e., the main effect of misstatement size 
in Panel B, p < 0.001).  
 
b These tests show significant effects with directional expectations, and therefore are the 
one-tailed p-values of the t-tests associated with the F-statistic, as applicable (e.g., 
Kachelmeier & Williamson, 2010; Bowlin et al., 2015). The remaining p-values represent 
two-tailed t-tests.  
 
c This contrast test assigns contrast weights of +3 to the low estimate 
uncertainty/disaggregated conditions, and −1 to the low estimate uncertainty/aggregated 
conditions, the high estimate uncertainty/aggregated conditions, and the high estimate 





Results for negligence in Table 3.2 are generally similar to those for standard of 
care in Table 3.1. Specifically, I find a positive main effect of misstatement size such that 
participants’ assessments of auditor negligence were higher when the misstatement was 
larger than when it was smaller (6.40 vs. 5.54, t = 4.52, F = 20.44 in Table 3.2 Panel B, p 
< 0.001). Also similar to my results for standard of care, besides this main effect, 
misstatement size does not interact significantly with my other manipulations in 
participants’ negligence judgments (p’s ≥ 0.530, Table 3.2 Panel B). In addition, I 
observe a statistically significant aggregation × estimate uncertainty interaction on 



















Figure 3.3 plots the means of this interaction. Similar to the findings for standard 
of care, I find that the +3, −1, −1, −1 contrast weight test on the aggregation × estimate 
uncertainty ordinal interaction on negligence judgments is statistically significant (t = 
2.62, p = 0.005; Table 3.2 Panel C). Furthermore, I find that this ordinal interaction and 
the main effect of misstatement size on negligence judgments together explain effectively 
all of the between-cells variance within my experiment (residual model variance semi-
omnibus F = 0.79 < 1, Table 3.2 Panel C; Buckless & Ravenscroft, 1990).11 Thus, the +3, 
−1, −1, −1 ordinal interaction and the misstatement size main effect provide a good 
statistical fit for participants’ negligence judgments and together explain effectively all of 
the systematic between-cells effects for this dependent variable.  Finally, simple effects 
tests of this interaction using negligence as a dependent variable generally replicate to 
those for standard of care, and are similarly consistent with the expected +3, −1, −1, −1 
ordinal interaction (Table 3.2 Panel D).12 Thus, the results for negligence judgments are 
generally consistent with those for standard of care. 
                                                          
11 Bayesian statistical techniques provide an affirmative test that the cells assigned weights of −1 are equal 
to one another (i.e., there is no residual between-cells variance), rather than just failing to reject the null 
hypothesis that they are equal (Bolstad, 2007; Kass & Raftery, 1995). These analyses indicate that, after 
controlling for the main effect of information on negligence judgments, the cells assigned weights of −1 are 
statistically equal to one another (all BF10’s ≤ 0.49; BFInclusion’s ≤ 0.30; Kass & Raftery, 1995). 
12 Visual comparison of the means for standard of care and negligence in Figures 3 and 5 show qualitative 
(but not significant) differences among some of the statistically insignificant simple effects. As Hayes 
(2013) and Preacher and Hayes (2008) point out, even when an overall path is significant, it is possible for 
the pattern of means observed in one response variable earlier in the path to change in subsequent response 
variables that come farther down the path, because other sources of variance will also impact each 
subsequent response variable. For this reason, Fanning et al. (2015) argue for testing hypotheses using the 
response variable that is the closest and best test of the underlying theory as the primary dependent variable 
of interest, and then looking at subsequent dependent variables, recognizing that there will be other sources 
of variance (including noisy variance with respect to the hypothesis tests) entering subsequent judgments 
father along the path. For my study, my theory predicts the joint effect of aggregation and estimate 
uncertainty on the basis of how they influence individuals’ perceptions of whether the auditors should have 
been able to detect the undetected misstatement (i.e., whether a properly conducted audit could have been 
able to detect the misstatement, or standard of care as I define it). These effects on standard of care should 
subsequently influence negligence judgments as individuals consider what was done relative to what 
auditors should have been able to do when forming their negligence judgments. My structural equation 
model (Figure 3.2) and formal tests of H2 are supportive of this. 
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3.4.2.6 Additional supplementary analyses. 
Aside from the manipulation checks and my dependent variables, I also collected 
participants’ beliefs that the auditors had the obligation to value the machinery and its 
related impairment loss accurately (perceived obligation) on a scale from 1 to 10. 
Participants’ mean judgments (7.97) were significantly above the midpoint of the scale (t 
= 28.14, p < 0.001), and did not vary significantly by experimental condition (omnibus F 
= 0.95 < 1).13 Thus, participants across conditions believed that auditors had a uniformly 
high obligation to value the machinery and its related impairment loss accurately, yet 
whether they held auditors accountable for failing to do so varied depending on the joint 
effects of aggregation and estimate uncertainty (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). Hence, I observe a 
disconnect between participants’ perceptions of auditors’ obligations and the extent to 
which they hold auditors accountable for failing to meet those obligations. This suggests 
that the effects I observe in Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are likely unconscious (and therefore 
pervasive and difficult for individuals to self-correct; Sherman et al. 2008).  As a result, 
the lack of guidance in accounting and auditing standards on financial statement 
aggregation is likely to include unintentional spillover effects on juror decision making in 
cases of accounting failure litigation. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 My experimental findings suggest that high levels of income statement 
aggregation have effects on juror decision making contrary to the intent of standard 
setters. Specifically, while participants in my study recognized that auditors should have 
                                                          
13 Bayesian statistical techniques provide an affirmative test of null effects, rather than failing to reject the 
null (Bolstad, 2007; Kass & Raftery, 1995). These analyses provide affirmative evidence that perceived 
obligation to detect the misstatement was similar across conditions (all BF10’s ≤ 0.36; BFInclusion’s ≤ 0.27; 
Kass & Raftery, 1995). 
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more ability to prevent material misstatement with low inherent estimate uncertainty, 
they still held auditors to a lower standard of care for failing to detect them when the 
misstated account was aggregated with other clean accounts in the same income 
statement line-item. Given the laxity of accounting standards on the issue, many 
companies (particularly those reporting under U.S. accounting standards) opt for high 
levels of income statement aggregation (Libby & Emett, 2014). Given that auditors are 
less likely to prevent misstatements that occur in aggregated income statement line-items 
(Libby & Brown, 2013), income statement aggregation may increase the likelihood of 
accounting failures. Yet, my findings suggest that aggregation may increase the risk of 
uncorrected material misstatements in the financial statements while simultaneously 
providing one of the gatekeepers of the financial statements (auditors) with some shelter 
from the legal implications of some of those uncorrected misstatements. Moreover, these 
effects are likely to be the result of unconscious effects on juror decision making. That is, 
even as my participants recognized on a between-subjects basis that auditors have more 
ability to evaluate less uncertain estimates (regardless of its aggregation or 
disaggregation), and even as they believed that the auditor had a uniformly high 
obligation to correct the undetected misstatement (regardless of experimental condition), 
they still held auditors to a lower standard of care and found them less negligent for 
failing to detect the less uncertain estimates simply by the simple presentation effect of 
line-item aggregation. The disconnect between jurors beliefs about auditors ability and 
obligation for detecting the material misstatement, and the extent to which they hold 
auditors responsible for failing to do so, suggests that standard setters’ lack of guidance 
on income statement aggregation may have unintended consequences that they do not 
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anticipate. Thus, I add to the small but growing literature on line-item aggregation in the 
financial statements, which reports mixed findings from other settings on the implications 
of financial statement aggregation (e.g., Bloomfield et al., 2015; Elliott et al., 2015; 
Libby & Brown 2013). 
My findings also have implications for the auditing literature on estimate 
uncertainty. There has been widespread concern that higher levels of estimate uncertainty 
open up auditors to excessive litigation risk (e.g., Christensen et al., 2012; Bell & Griffin, 
2012). While estimate uncertainty may incrementally increase the likelihood of litigation, 
my findings suggest that, once in litigation, higher levels of estimate uncertainty actually 
lower auditors’ legal exposure to negligence judgments when the financial statements are 
relatively disaggregated, by way of its effects on jurors’ standard of care for auditors. 
Thus, once in the courtroom, high estimate uncertainty can potentially decrease (rather 
than increase) auditors’ litigation risks under common conditions. 
My findings are subject to limitations. I do not test all aspects of aggregation and 
estimate uncertainty that may influence my findings. Furthermore, other task-, 
environmental-, or decision-maker factors may moderate, alter, or impose boundary 
conditions on the effects that we demonstrate. As the implications of line-item 
aggregation and estimate uncertainty are not yet well understood at various stages of the 
managerial decision making, financial reporting, investing, and corporate governance 
cycle, future research may examine the effects that I document as they affect other facets 





THE OPPOSITE EFFECTS OF HIGH ESTIMATE UNCERTAINTY ON 
JURORS' JUDGMENTS AND ON LAWYERS' SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN 
AUDITOR NEGLIGENCE LITIGATION 
4.1 Introduction 
Auditors have become increasingly responsible to express opinions on valuation 
estimates for illiquid assets with no observable market value (Griffin 2014). The 
estimation techniques for these assets often involve highly subjective assumptions and 
therefore highly uncertain valuations. Auditors and accounting researchers have 
expressed concerns that high levels of estimate uncertainty will subject auditors to 
unfairly high litigation risk (e.g., Christensen et al. 2012; Bell and Griffin 2012). 
Auditors’ litigation risk has always been large, but concerns over it have grown as the 
size of inherent uncertainty in valuation estimates has increased. For example, 
Christensen et al. (2012) note that in many modern cases the range of estimate 
uncertainty exceeds the size material misstatements by several times, suggesting that 
auditors can potentially face onerous litigation costs as the level of estimate uncertainty 
leads to material misstatements that may be beyond auditor’s ability to fully control. 
From 1995-2007, the largest six accounting firms paid out $5.66 billion to resolve over 
362 cases (US Treasury 2008). In 2007, the litigation and practice-protection costs of the 
firms totaled 15.1% of the firms’ overall audit-related revenue (US Treasury 2008). 
 In this study, I develop theory and predictions that high levels of estimate 
uncertainty in an undetected material misstatement may have directionally opposite 
effects on auditor liability, depending on whether the case is judged by jurors in a trial or 
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settled by lawyers in out-of-court negotiations. In the second study of my dissertation, I 
demonstrate that high estimate uncertainty causes jurors to judge auditors less harshly for 
undetected material misstatements that occur in relatively disaggregated financial 
statement line-items. In contrast, I predict and find that high estimate uncertainty causes 
auditors’ lawyers to believe that the auditors are more vulnerable for failing to detect a 
material misstatement, and become willing to make more concessions in out-of-court 
settlement negotiation, regardless of whether the misstatement is in an aggregated or 
disaggregated line-item. I predict that these directionally opposite effects stem from 
lawyers sensing vulnerability to juror judgments but predicting jurors’ reactions to 
uncertainty in the wrong direction.   
I test my hypotheses in a 2 × 2 between-subjects experimental design. Lawyers 
read an auditor negligence litigation case as counsel to the auditors. The case (adapted 
from prior research) involves an alleged material misstatement in the valuation of highly 
customized mining and quarrying machinery. Investors allege that a material impairment 
in the machinery should have been apparent to the auditors during the audit, and the 
investors experienced losses as a result of the materially misstated audited financial 
statements. I manipulated whether the valuation and impairment judgment involved 
higher or lower inherent estimate uncertainty, and whether the alleged misstatement 
occurred in an account that was either aggregated with other accounts into a single 
income-statement line-item, or disaggregated as its own income statement line-item (see 
Libby and Brown 2013; Libby and Emett 2014; FASB 2010). Lawyers rated (as counsel 
to the auditors) how strong of a position they felt the auditors had, how strong of a 
position they felt the investors had, how likely the case would be settled out of court, how 
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committed they would be to their initial settlement offer, how willing they would be to 
make concessions during negotiation, their negotiating goal for the minimum payout (in 
dollars) they would hope to get the opposition to accept, their negotiating limit of the 
maximum payout they would be willing to accept, and final negotiated settlement amount 
they expected their clients to pay. Furthermore, since lawyers read the same experimental 
case used in the second study of my dissertation to measure mock jurors’ judgments, I 
asked the lawyers to predict the standard of care that the mock jurors would hold auditors 
to, as well as the mock jurors’ negligence judgments for the auditors, and directly 
compare the lawyers’ predictions of mock juror behavior to mock jurors’ actual behavior. 
Results show that lawyers make incorrect predictions about the effects of estimate 
uncertainty on jurors’ standard of care for auditors and on jurors’ perceptions of auditor 
negligence. Specifically, while high estimate uncertainty leads jurors to hold auditors to a 
lower standard of care and judge them as less negligent for undetected material 
misstatements in relatively disaggregated financial statement line-items, lawyers 
mistakenly expect jurors to hold auditors to a higher standard of care and judge auditors 
more negligent when estimate uncertainty is high (regardless of whether the misstatement 
occurred in an aggregated or disaggregated line-item).  
This result is consistent hypothesis I build from prior research and theory. 
Specifically, I theorize that expert-lawyers would adopt an overly simplistic perspective 
of novice-jurors’ performance evaluations and attributions of blame. My findings suggest 
further that these erroneous beliefs about jurors (and their reactions to estimate 
uncertainty) result in significant and unnecessary out-of-court settlement losses to 
auditors. Specifically, as auditors’ lawyers misperceive the direction of the effect of 
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estimate uncertainty on juror judgments, estimate uncertainty concurrently leads lawyers 
to mistakenly assume that their clients hold a weaker position relative to the opposition, 
makes them less committed to their initial negotiating position, more willing to concede, 
adopt less ambitious negotiating goals and limits for their clients’ minimum and 
maximum possible payouts (respectively), and ultimately expect to settle for larger 
amounts of money in out-of-court settlement. Furthermore, structural equation modeling 
of lawyers’ judgments suggest that all of these effects of estimate uncertainty on lawyers’ 
negotiating behavior stem from the lawyers’ mistaken beliefs about jurors.  
Despite the worse negotiation prospects for auditors in the high estimate 
uncertainty conditions, lawyers across all conditions uniformly believed that the case had 
a high likelihood of being settled out of court. This is consistent with evidence suggesting 
that the majority of auditor liability amounts are determined in out-of-court settlement 
(e.g., Palmrose 1991). Thus, the divergent effects I find on juror judgments and lawyers’ 
out-of-court settlement judgments are important to understanding auditor litigation risk, 
given the prominent role out-of-court settlement plays in the resolution of auditor 
negligence litigation. 
This study has important theoretical and practical contributions. First, this study 
contributes to the literature on high estimate uncertainty and auditor litigation risk, by 
showing that whether estimate uncertainty increases or decreases auditor litigation risk 
for undetected material misstatements depends on whether the litigation is settled by 
lawyers negotiating out of court or by jury. Second, auditors’ legal counsel may have 
systematic misperceptions of juror judgments, which cause them to systematically 
underestimate the strength of their client’s position relative to the opposition and 
75 
 
therefore concede more in negotiations. Thus, lawyers’ potential misunderstanding of 
their clients’ vulnerability to jurors may carry significant costs for auditors, in the most 
common venue for resolving auditor negligence litigation. Third, this study has 
implications for auditor negligence research more broadly. The vast majority of auditor 
liability is determined in out-of-court settlement (Palmrose 1991, 1999), and yet the vast 
majority of research on the resolution of auditor negligence litigation has focused on 
juror judgments (as Donelson, Kadous, and McInnes [2014] point out). While juror 
judgments are important to understand auditor litigation risk in a non-trivial proportion of 
cases, my study illustrates that auditors may face very different litigation risk in out-of-
court settlement, where the vast majority of auditor liability is determined. Thus, my 
study responds to the call of Donelson et al. (2014) to investigate how well auditors’ 
litigation risk, as proxied in juror studies, generalizes to auditors’ litigation risk in out-of-
court settlement.  
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 Estimate Uncertainty and Auditors’ Litigation Risk 
 Fair value measurement is becoming a higher risk for financial reporters, auditors, 
and investors, because the standards and estimation techniques are increasingly complex, 
subjective, and uncertain (e.g., Ayres, Neal, Reid and Shipman 2014; FASB 2011; 
KPMG 2013; Ramana and Watts 2012). Auditors may not have the appropriate expertise 
for many complex estimates, and they may audit them using techniques more applicable 
to ordinary transactions (Griffith et al. 2015a). In particular, the range of uncertainty 
surrounding some accounting estimates can exceed materiality thresholds by several 
times (Christensen et al. 2012). Furthermore, auditors may face excessively high 
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litigation risk if investors and other stakeholders do not appreciate the difficult position 
that high inherent estimate uncertainty places auditors in when trying to identify material 
misstatements (e.g., Christensen et al. 2012; Bell and Griffin 2012).  
However, how high estimate uncertainty directly influences auditors’ litigation 
risk is unclear. On one hand, high estimate uncertainty increases the likelihood of 
material misstatements in unaudited financial statements (Griffith et al. 2015a). On the 
other hand, auditors react to high estimate uncertainty by requiring more audit 
adjustments (Griffin 2014). The net effect on actual litigation risk is unknown because, as 
Donelson et al. (2014, 63) note, there is only minimal archival data on damage awards, 
especially for cases settled out of court. Nevertheless, archival research suggests a 
widespread belief among auditors that higher estimate uncertainty increases their 
litigation risk for undetected material misstatements in audited financial statements, as 
manifested in higher audit fees and auditor-client resignations (Ayres et al. 2014; 
Goncharov, Reidl and Sellhorn 2014). In this study, I examine the possibility that the 
effect of high estimate uncertainty on an auditor’s litigation risk for undetected material 
misstatements may go in opposite directions, depending on whether a case is judged by 
jurors or negotiated by lawyers in out-of-court settlement.  
4.2.2 Juror Judgments and Lawyer Settlement Negotiations 
 The majority of auditor liability is determined in out-of-court settlement. Using 
Palmrose’s (1999) auditor litigation database, I investigated the frequency with which 
auditor liability is determined at trial versus out-of-court settlement, and summarized the 
results in Table 4.1. The database includes the resolution type of 235 cases that proceeded 
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to resolution from 1960-1995.14 Results of these analyses suggest that approximately 
73% of lawsuits were resolved by settlement (settlement to avoid litigation, pre-trial 
settlement, or post-trial settlement; Table 4.1). Close to 19% were resolved by trial (or 
post-trial appeal; Table 4.1), which would include both jury trials and judge-only trials. 
Finally, approximately 8% were resolved by one or more resolution type.15
                                                          
14 The database includes another 157 apparently frivolous lawsuits that were either withdrawn by the 
plaintiff or dismissed before proceeding to resolution, and for which there was no auditor liability. Since 
anyone can file a frivolous lawsuit, I exclude dismissed or withdrawn lawsuits from these analyses. 
15 For cases involving a combination of resolution types, the database does not identify which two or more 
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This table summarizes the frequency of cases that proceeded to resolution in Palmrose’s (1999) auditor litigation database. The 
database includes another 157 apparently frivolous lawsuits that were either withdrawn by the plaintiff or altogether dismissed 
before proceeding to resolution, and for which there was no auditor liability. The subcategory “combination” shows cases with 
more than one resolution type, though the database does not identify which two or more resolution types were involved.  
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 Given the massive total liability faced by auditors suggests that all of these 
resolution types are economically significant. The $5.66 billion paid by the largest six 
accounting firms to resolve litigation from 1995-2007 for 362 cases (US Treasury 2008). 
In 2007, a full 15.1% of those firms’ audit revenues went to litigation and practice-
protection costs (US Treasury 2008). Moreover, even the prospects of auditor liability 
influence auditor behavior on the vast majority of cases which are not litigated. Yet, as 
Donelson et al. (2014) point out, research on the resolution process has focused almost 
exclusively on juror judgment and decision making, despite the fact that the vast majority 
of auditor litigation is resolved in out-of-court settlement. As a result, very little is known 
yet about out-of-court settlement of auditor litigation, factors that influence it, or how it 
differs from juror judgments (Donelson et al. 2014, 63). 
4.2.3 Estimate Uncertainty, Juror Judgments, and Lawyer Negotiations in Out-of-Court 
Settlement 
 Legal theory has assumed that settlement negotiations are influenced in part by 
lawyer’s expectations about how jurors would decide a case if it were to go to trial 
(Seabury 2012). As Grenier et al. (2015) and Donelson et al. (2014) note, accounting 
research has implicitly or explicitly relied on this assumption when asserting that juror 
studies provide a reasonable proxy for auditor’s litigation risk overall. However, this 
assumption also relies on an assumption that lawyer’s expectations about juror judgments 
are accurate (Alexander 1991; Seabury 2013). Yet, as Seabury (2013, 15) states in the 
legal research literature, “despite the theoretical importance of litigant expectations 
[about jury judgments] in driving settlement behavior, we have relatively little knowledge 
about how expectations are actually formed.” Accounting research has also not yet 
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studied the accuracy or inaccuracy of lawyer’s expectations, factors that systematically 
influence that accuracy or inaccuracy, and whether or how those accurate or inaccurate 
expectations influence subsequent settlement negotiations (Donelson et al. 2014).  
 Accounting estimate uncertainty provides an interesting contextual factor to test 
these assumptions. Besides being a timely factor with important practical implications for 
auditors and their litigation risks (e.g., Hay, Knechel, and Willekens 2014; Griffith et al. 
2015a, 2015b; Griffin 2014), it is also a theoretically rich factor for testing the accuracy 
of lawyer’s expectations of juror behavior, because there are at least two possible ways 
jurors would react to high levels of estimate uncertainty, with potentially divergent 
implications. 
  Under one perspective of juror judgment, jurors react negatively to high estimate 
uncertainty and see the auditor more as blameworthy for not being more careful and 
expressing an incorrect audit opinion amid high uncertainty. This perspective focuses on 
jurors having a generalized dislike of uncertainty, reacting with negative emotional 
affect, and allowing that affect to spread as they look to find a cause for plaintiff’s losses 
and spread blame. This perspective sees jurors as highly naïve, since it expects to react 
negatively to uncertainty, regardless of its source, not recognizing the role that 
environmental and chance factors beyond the auditor’s control play in a misstated 
estimate of inherently high uncertainty. Furthermore, jurors may be so motivated by 
plaintiff’s losses to lay blame that they do not attempt any attributions of a failure to 
alternative causes. Under this perspective, high estimate uncertainty would elevate jurors’ 
assessments of auditor negligence. 
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 In contrast to this more naïve perspective, another perspective recognizes jurors as 
more boundedly rational (cf. Hastie and Dawes 2010). According to Attribution Theory, 
evaluators of other’s performance attempt to attribute an observed failure (e.g., an 
uncorrected material misstatement in audited financial statements) to either internal 
causes, relational causes, or external causes, searching for appropriate cues (Eberly et al. 
2011; Burton et al. 2014). Internal causes include factors within the evaluatee’s control 
(e.g., auditor negligence), external causes include factors outside of the evaluatee’s 
control (e.g., chance), and relational causes include factors that arise from interactions 
between the evaluatee’s and other actors (e.g., auditor independence problems leading to 
undetected management fraud). Furthermore, evaluators do not rush to attribute all 
possible causes of an observed failure to one of these three sources. Instead, evaluators 
tend to cautiously withhold some attributions, instead holding some “belief in reserve” 
(e.g., Shafer 1976; Curley 2007). This tendency to hold belief in reserve increases as 
evaluators cannot clearly attribute the cause anywhere, as the stakes of their judgment are 
high, and as their relative familiarity and confidence with the subject matter decreases 
(e.g., Macchi, Osherson and Krantz 1999). This cautious behavior has been demonstrated 
among jurors (Curley 2007).  
 The second study of my dissertation proposes this latter (less naïve) perspective of 
juror judgment and use it to predict that jurors will react to high estimate uncertainty by 
evaluating auditors more (rather than less) favorably. In particular, the second study of 
my dissertation proposes that jurors evaluate auditor negligence by thinking naturally in 
terms of whether a properly conducted audit would have corrected a material 
misstatement. They refer to this as jurors’ “standard of care” for auditors, since, the 
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more jurors believe that a properly conducted audit would have corrected a misstatement, 
the higher a standard of care jurors are holding auditors to for failing to detect the 
misstatement. Attribution Theory suggests that, thinking in terms of this standard of care, 
jurors would then be able to see that high estimate uncertainty lowers the extent to which 
even a properly conducted audit could have detected a misstatement. Thus, high estimate 
uncertainty would make jurors less likely to attribute the cause of the accounting failure 
to internal factors within the auditors control (i.e., auditor negligence). 
 The second study of my dissertation finds supportive evidence of this latter (less 
naïve) perspective of jurors. Specifically, they presented mock jurors with an auditor 
negligence case, involving an undetected material misstatement. In a 2 × 2 × 2 between-
subjects experiment, they manipulated the level of uncertainty surrounding the material 
misstatement (higher vs. lower estimate uncertainty), whether the misstated account 
appeared as its own line-item on the income statement or whether it was aggregated into 
a single line-item with other, non-misstated accounts (aggregated vs. disaggregated 
income statement), as well as the size of the material misstatement (larger vs. smaller). 
The level of aggregation or disaggregation of accounts in financial statement line-items is 
discretionary to reporting firms, and financial statements in practice vary widely in their 
level of aggregation or disaggregation (Libby and Brown 2013; Libby and Emett 2014; 
Chen, Miao, and Shevlin 2015). Holding all other aspects of a material misstatement 
constant, disaggregating the materially misstated account with its own line-item on the 
income statement makes the misstatement appear larger with respect to the size of its 
line-item, even though it has no effect on the size of the misstatement relative to net 
income, sales, total assets, or any other line of the financial statements. However, because 
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disaggregation makes the misstatement appear more salient, the second study of my 
dissertation finds that it elevates both the standard of care they hold the auditors to for 
failing to find the misstatement, as well their assessments of auditor negligence, but only 
when estimate uncertainty is inherently low. In contrast, when estimate uncertainty is 
high, jurors appear more capable of attributing the cause of the misstatement to factors 
other than auditor negligence, hold auditors to a lower standard of care for failing to 
detect the misstatement, and find them less negligent. The findings from the second study 
of my dissertation appear in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.3.16 
 Lawyers in out-of-court settlement will be unlikely to predict juror judgments 
accurately. To do so requires a prediction of what would occur if a case under settlement 
were to go to trial, and a large body of psychology has shown that even experts are bad 
predictors (see, e.g., Camerer and Johnson 1997). In particular, predictions in this task 
require that experts (litigation lawyers in out-of-court settlement) predict what novices’ 
(i.e., jurors’) judgments would be. Individuals in general tend to place high confidence in 
their own judgments and give others less credit for being boundedly rational (Pronin 
2002, 2007; Pronin et al. 2004; Ross et al. 2004). Experts in particular self-servingly 
place too much confidence in their own judgments relative to novices’ judgments 
(Armstrong 1991; Thom-Santelli, Cosley, and Gay 2010). When people feel that they 
                                                          
16 In the second study of my dissertation, the pattern of findings shown in Figure 1 was robust to the size of 
the material misstatement. That is, I tested the estimate uncertainty × disaggregation interaction shown in 
Figure 1 under conditions of (1) a material misstatement that was both quantitatively and qualitatively 
material, and (2) a material misstatement that was larger (by several times). Figure 1 shows the second 
study of my dissertation's results within the conditions of the more standard quantitatively material 
misstatement, and the same pattern occurs for the larger material misstatement as well. For my experiment 
studying attorneys’ settlements, I chose to use the second study's experimental conditions using the more 
standard quantitatively material misstatement, to demonstrate significant effects on attorneys’ out-of-court 
settlement negotiations on more quantitatively normal misstatements, without needing to resort to 
extremely large material misstatements to demonstrate effects. As a result, the means shown in Figure 1 for 
jurors’ judgments are the basis for comparison to attorneys’ beliefs about jurors’ judgments. 
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belong to an expert or enlightened group, they become territorial, are more likely to 
assume that others’ judgments are poor and naïve, and give novices less credit for being 
boundedly rational (Ehrlinger, Gilovich, and Ross 2005; Thom-Santelli et al. 2010). 
Empirical research suggests that lawyers often tend to view themselves overconfidently 
(e.g., Birke and Fox 1999; Babcock and Pogarsky 1999; Kiser, Asher and McShane 
2008), suggesting that they may not always give jurors adequate credit for being 
boundedly rational. 
 If so, then lawyers may be more likely to adopt the more naïve perspective of 
juror decision making with respect to predicting the effects of estimate uncertainty on 
their judgments. That is, lawyers would likely expect jurors to hold auditors more 
responsible for failing to detect a material misstatement when uncertainty is high. Viewed 
this way by lawyers, high estimate uncertainty would elevate both (1) the standard of care 
jurors hold auditors to for failing to detect the material misstatement and (2) juror 
assessments of auditor negligence. If lawyers hold this viewpoint, their predictions of 
jurors would be inaccurate, compared to actual effects of estimate uncertainty on juror 
judgments (see Figure 3.1 and 3.3). This discussion suggests the following hypotheses: 
H1:  Auditors’ legal counsel will incorrectly predict jurors’ standard of care for 
auditors to be greater when estimate uncertainty is higher than when 
estimate uncertainty is lower.  
 
H2:  Auditors’ legal counsel will incorrectly predict jurors’ negligence 
judgments for auditors to be greater when estimate uncertainty is higher 
than when estimate uncertainty is lower. 
 
 H1 and H2 have important implications for negotiation outcomes and, ultimately, 
auditors’ litigation risk. Out-of-court negotiations over settlement are likely to be 
influenced by a number of factors, but they are likely to reflect lawyers’ predictions of 
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when they are more or less vulnerable to jurors. If so, then inaccuracies in lawyers’ 
predictions are likely to influence their perceptions of the strength of their negotiating 
position and of the opposition’s negotiating position, their willingness to concede, their 
negotiating strategies (e.g., the dollar amounts of their negotiating limits and targets), 
and, ultimately, the final negotiated settlement amounts. This suggests the following 
hypothesis:  
H3:  Lawyers’ incorrect beliefs about jurors’ standard of care for auditors (H1) 
and auditor negligence judgments (H2) will, in turn, lead auditors’ legal 
counsel to: 
(a) perceive themselves to be in a weaker negotiating position relative 
to the opposition,  
(b) become more willing to concede on behalf of auditors,  
(c) adopt less ambitious negotiating goals and negotiating limits in 
out-of-court settlement negotiations for auditors, and  
(d) anticipate higher final financial settlement amounts for auditors to 
pay out,  
when estimate uncertainty is higher than when estimate uncertainty is 
lower. 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the theoretical structural model suggested by my theory and H3. 
Specifically, the model in Figure 4.1 posits that higher estimate uncertainty will 
(incorrectly) lead attorneys to believe that jurors would hold auditors to a higher standard 
of care, which would lead to higher juror negligence judgments against auditors, which 
would weaken the attorney’s perceived negotiating position (as legal counsel for the 
auditors), which lead them to adopt less ambitious negotiating goals and limits for 
auditors’ payouts, and, ultimately, anticipate higher final settlement amounts for auditors 
to pay out. In addition, since variance is likely to exist in how “tough,” “aggressive,” or 
“ambitious” negotiating attorneys are (relative to one another), then more (less) ambitious 
negotiating goals would tend to co-occur with more (less) ambitious negotiating limits. 
Thus, the theoretical structural model allows negotiating goals and limits to co-vary (i.e., 
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the double-headed arcing arrow in Figure 4.1), in order to control for this predictable 
source of variation.17 Besides each link in Figure 4.1 being individually significant, my 
theory for H3 suggests that the entire path in Figure 4.1 should be positive and 
statistically significant (i.e., indicating that higher estimate uncertainty ultimately leads to 
higher final settlement payouts for auditors, through the path posited by H3 and the 
model in Figure 4.1).18 
Figure 4.1 
Theoretical Structural Model 
 
  
                                                          
17 Prior negotiation research suggests that negotiation goals, negotiation limits, and expected final 
settlement amounts are related but distinct constructs (e.g., Hatfield, Agoglia, and Sanchez 2008, Bame-
Aldred and Kida 2007). Accordingly, my theoretical model treats them this way (Figure 2). 
18 Significantly positive overall paths can be demonstrated by testing whether the products-of-coefficients 
for a path (such as a×b×c×d×e1×f1, a×b×c×d×e2×f2, and a×b×c×d×(e1×f1+e2×f2)) are significantly positive. 
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If supported, H3 suggests that auditors’ legal counsel may make unnecessary 
concessions during out-of-court settlement, including unnecessary financial costs for 
auditors, when estimate uncertainty is high.19 It also suggests for the auditing research 
literature that juror judgments alone may be a poor proxy for auditor litigation outcomes 
in the majority of cases that are settled out of court (Table 4.1), and, therefore, an 
incomplete proxy for auditor litigation risk overall. More specifically, not only does my 
theory suggest that settlement negotiation outcomes may be different from juror 
judgments, high estimate uncertainty may even cause them to go in opposite directions. 
4.2.4 Disaggregation, Estimate Uncertainty, and Lawyers’ Predictions of Jurors 
 The second study of my dissertation finds that jurors’ standard of care and 
negligence judgments are highest when estimate uncertainty is low and the financial 
statements are disaggregated, and relatively lower when either the estimate uncertainty is 
high, the financial statements are aggregated, or both (Figure 3.1 and 3.3). H1 and H2 
predict that lawyers’ predictions of jurors judgments will go systematically in the wrong 
direction with respect to estimate uncertainty. Furthermore, it is also unlikely that lawyers 
will predict the joint effect of estimate uncertainty and financial statement aggregation on 
jurors’ judgments (i.e., the ordinal interactions in Figure 3.1 and 3.3). Experts are poor at 
predictions in general (e.g., Meehl 1986), and their predictions become increasingly poor 
as they attempt to predict interactive effects (e.g., Camerer and Johnson 1997). Thus, 
while experts are unlikely to predict jurors judgments correctly with respect to estimate 
                                                          
19 Archival legal research suggests that defendants’ legal counsel may often offer too much in concessions, 
though the causes of when they do so are not yet well understood. For example, Kiser et al. (2008, 567) 
examine 2,043 civil lawsuits that went to trial following failed negotiations, and find that in a full 61.2% of 
those cases, defendant legal counsel made unnecessarily generous settlement offers during negotiations 
than they needed to based on trial outcomes. My study potentially illuminates when and why auditors’ legal 
counsel may make unnecessary concessions during out-of-court negotiations, and my conclusions also 
extend to the majority of cases that are settled out of court without going to trial (Table 1). 
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uncertainty (H1 and H2), they are also unlikely to predict jurors’ judgments correctly as a 
joint function of low estimate uncertainty and financial statement disaggregation. This 
suggests the following hypotheses: 
H4:  Auditors’ legal counsel will not correctly predict the joint effect of low 
estimate uncertainty and financial statement disaggregation on jurors’ 
standard of care for auditors or on jurors’ negligence judgments.  
 
 In fact, whether or how financial statement disaggregation will influence lawyers’ 
predictions of juror judgments at all is unclear. Disaggregation changes the relative size 
of a material misstatement when compared to its own financial statement line-item, but 
not when compared to earnings, sales, earnings per share, total assets, total liabilities, 
total equity, retained earnings, or other prominent line-items. The second study of my 
dissertation finds that disaggregation of a material misstatement affects jurors’ 
perceptions of its effects on the fair presentation of its line-item, and, in turn, jurors’ 
perceptions on the fair presentation of the financial statements as a whole. However, 
lawyers may feel that, once a misstatement has passed the hurdle that it can be 
characterized for jurors as material, jurors may be focused on that characterization, but 
after that will be insensitive to variation relative materiality. This viewpoint would be 
consistent with my theory that lawyers likely adopt a perspective of jurors as highly naïve 
and relatively insensitive to variation in finer gradations of materiality. If so, they would 
under-appreciate the sensitivity that jurors actually show to aggregation. This suggest the 
following research question: 
 RQ1:  Will financial statement disaggregation influence lawyers’ predictions of 









 Because I am hypothesizing differences between jurors' judgments and lawyers’ 
out-of-court settlement negotiations, I sought highly experienced lawyers with relevant 
expertise as participants for this study. To facilitate their participation, the experiment 
was administered through Qualtrics® online software, with a single link that randomly 
assigned participants to different experimental conditions. To obtain primary contacts for 
recruiting participants, a high-level senior executive at one of the world’s largest and 
most prestigious commercial and investment banking firms assisted me with his personal 
contacts of 31 highly experienced and established senior-partner-level lawyers at major 
corporate law practices. I supplemented this primary contact list with another 11 first- 
and second-degree connections of my own. In all, I directly contacted 39 lawyers as 
primary contacts, asking them to participate in the study themselves and to share the 
Qualtrics® link with their colleagues who also have legal negotiation experience and 
expertise in corporate law. Of these 39 contacts, 31 are in law practices, while eight serve 
as counsel for corporations. Of the 31 attorneys in law practices, all came from firms 
practicing commercial litigation, and 14 came from Am Law 200 firms, the top 200 
grossing law firms in the United States. The primary contacts generally indicated 
willingness to participate in the study and/or to share the link with their colleagues.  
 One hundred seventy-seven lawyers clicked on the Qualtrics® link but dropped 
out at the Informed Consent page, while another 87 lawyers gave their consent and began 
the study, with 74 completing the study. The participants had, on average, 21.4 years of 
legal experience and 13.5% of them were female. The post-experimental questionnaire 
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asked participants to rate their relative level of familiarity with civil proceedings, 
business law, torts, and negligence on a scale from 1 to 10 and also asked them a free-
response question to provide their personal specializations. The participants indicated 
high levels of familiarity with civil proceedings (7.61), business law (8.07), torts (6.96), 
and negligence (7.65) (all significantly above the mid-point of the scale, p-values < 
0.001), 95% explicitly mentioned specializations in business, corporate, or securities law 
in their answers to the free-response question, and 58% explicitly mentioned litigation as 
a specialization.20  Thus it appears that the participants have appropriate knowledge and 
experience to make legal judgments and decisions in my experimental setting. 
4.3.2 Task and Manipulations  
The attorney participants read a legal case in which investors alleged auditor 
negligence leading to a material misstatement in audited financial statements. To 
facilitate comparison of attorneys’ judgments to jurors’ judgments, I adapted the 
experimental materials from the second study of my dissertation, which had mock jurors 
read and decide the same case. 
I use a 2 × 2 between-subjects experimental design. I manipulate the level of 
estimate uncertainty in the account that gave rise to the alleged misstatement (high vs. 
low). In addition, I also manipulate the level of disaggregation of the misstatement. 
Specifically, I manipulate whether the misstated account appeared as its own line-item on 
                                                          
20 The free-response specialization required that lawyers unpromptedly mention litigation among their 
specializations, and consequently this measure is likely to understate the proportion with litigation 
experience. My results and conclusions do not systematically depend on whether lawyers explicitly 
mentioned specialization in litigation and/or business, corporate, or securities law in their answers to the 
free-response question.  
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the income statement (disaggregated) or combined with other accounts into a single 
financial statement line-item (aggregated; see Libby and Brown 2013; FASB 2010).21 
 At the beginning of the case, participants were informed that they would be 
assume the role of legal counsel for the auditors and be asked for their legal judgment on 
the case. The attorney participants were also told that the case had also been presented to 
college students in the role of mock jurors, and that research in accounting, law, and 
psychology shows that college students are good proxies for jurors, forming judgments 
similar to jurors in negligence settings.22 The materials also told the attorney participants 
that the mock jurors averaged 2.51 years of post-high school education and that 44% 
were female. 
 The experimental materials then provided the attorney participants with 
background information that explained basic auditing concepts (such as material 
misstatements, clean audit opinions, reasonable assurance, audit procedures, etc.), as well 
as five related comprehension questions that the mock jurors had also read (adapted from 
Peecher and Piercey 2008). For each comprehension question, the attorney participants 
were shown the percentage of mock jurors who had answered the question correctly 
(which ranged from 95.1% to 99.5% for individual comprehension questions). Thus, 
                                                          
21 The second study of my dissertation manipulates these variables and also the size of the material 
misstatement (i.e., a quantitatively and qualitatively material misstatement vs. a much larger material 
misstatement). They find that low estimate uncertainty and disaggregation jointly increase jurors’ standard 
of care for auditors and auditor negligence judgments. These effects occur similarly for extremely large vs. 
more normal material misstatements. For this experiment, I selected the more normal-sized material 
misstatement for attorneys to evaluate (see footnote 3 for more details).  
22 Specifically, meta-analyses across many juror research studies show that undergraduates’ and jurors’ 
judgments are similar across a variety of task factors and contexts (Bornsein 1999; Zickafoose and 
Bornstein 1999). The accounting research that uses both undergraduates and wider samples of jury-eligible 
adults replicates this similarity in their judgments (e.g., Cornell, Warne and Eining 2009; Grenier, Pomeroy 
and Stern 2015, Kadous 2001). As a result, accounting research commonly uses college students as mock 
jurors (e.g., Kadous and Mercer, 2012; Reffett 2010; Peecher and Piercey 2008; Grenier, Pomeroy and 
Reffett, 2012).  
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lawyer participants knew that the mock jurors had a basic understanding of the concepts 
surrounding an auditor negligence case and had paid attention. 
 Participants then read about a fictional mining company, Big Time Gravel, which 
had been audited by Jones & Company (adapted from Kadous 200, 2001; Peecher and 
Piercey 2008). A large portion of the company’s assets was mining equipment that was 
highly customized to the company’s mines, quarries, and processing sites, and therefore 
did not have readily available market prices. As a result, the management of the mining 
company used mathematical valuation models to estimate the fair value of the machinery 
and determine whether an impairment loss should be recorded. 
 In the high estimate uncertainty condition, participants were told that the model is 
based on highly subjective and very complicated assumptions about the cash that the 
machinery will generate as well, as other difficult projections about the unpredictable 
future costs of operating the machinery. As a result, the auditors estimated the value of 
the machinery to be between $350 and $650 million. 
 In the low estimate uncertainty condition, participants were told that the model is 
based on highly objective and straightforward assumptions about the cash that the 
machinery will generate as well as other simple projections about the predictable future 
costs of operating the machinery. The auditors in this condition estimated the value of the 
machinery to be between $450 and $550 million. 
 In all conditions, the company recorded the value of the machinery at $545 
million, which resulted in a $10 million impairment loss. Jones & Company issued an 
unqualified audit opinion on Big Time Gravel's financials.  
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Next, the case described the alleged misstatement in the financial statements that 
resulted in the lawsuit. After the audited financial statements were issued, Big Time 
Gravel’s mining machinery went down, creating high costs of repair and lost revenue. 
The investors allege that the poor condition of the machinery should have been apparent 
to the auditors during the audit of the financial statements, before the financial statements 
were issued with a clean opinion. Witnesses for the investors testified that, based on 
information the auditors should have recognized, the true value of the machinery should 
have been $495 million, and that the impairment loss should have been $60 million, 
rather than $10 million. The $50 million misstatement exceeds 0.5% of sales, a 
quantitative materiality threshold used commonly in practice (Eilifsen and Messier 2015). 
In addition, the misstatement allowed Big Time Gravel to meet (rather than just miss) 
analysts’ forecasts, making the misstatement qualitatively material as well as 
quantitatively (SEC 1999). The investors alleged further that if the loss of $60 million 
was to have been recorded by the company, they would have not remained invested in the 
company. 
Finally, following the case materials from the second study of my dissertation, 
participants read an excerpt from Big Time Gravel’s income statement. To show the 
alleged misstatement, separate columns showed the numbers as reported in the audited 
financial statements, the numbers as the investors alleged that they should have been 
reported, and the difference between the two, in dollars and in percentages. In the 
aggregated financial statement conditions, the alleged misstatement in impairment loss 
was aggregated with other financial statement accounts into a single “Cost of goods sold” 
line-item. In the disaggregated conditions, “Cost of goods sold” was broken down into 
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multiple separate line-items, including a separate line-item for the impairment loss on the 
machinery. This disaggregation manipulation follows an exemplar provided by FASB 
(2010) extremely closely, which disaggregates “Cost of goods sold” in almost exactly the 
same way. This manipulation is also similar to the disaggregation manipulation of Libby 
and Brown (2013). Four lawyers with 38 years of legal experience combined (including a 
former law school dean and  a U.S. district court clerk) reviewed the experimental 
materials to ensure that the information would be admissible in court as presented in the 
case. 
4.3.3 Response Variables 
 After reviewing the financial statements, the attorneys made several judgments 
related to the legal settlement of the Jones & Company audit of Big Time Gravel. 
Specifically, for testing H1, the instrument measured attorneys’ predictions of the mock 
jurors’ standard of care for the auditors (Perceived Juror Standard of Care). Specifically, 
attorney’s predicted the mock jurors’ beliefs about how likely it is (on a scale from 1 to 
10) that a properly conducted audit could have correctly valued the machinery and its 
related impairment loss. Following the example of the second study of my dissertation, I 
label this judgment the jurors’ “standard of care,” since, the more likely a properly 
conducted audit could have correctly valued the machinery, the higher a standard of care 
jurors are holding auditors to for failing to do so. For testing H2, the instrument measured 
attorneys’ predictions of the mock jurors’ auditor negligence judgments, on a scale from 
1 to 10 (Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments). These two response variables also 
allow me to test H4 and RQ1.  
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For testing H3, the instrument developed several measures of the out-of-court 
settlement negotiation process. This included three measures of the attorney’s perceptions 
of the strength of the auditor’s out-of-court settlement negotiating position relative to the 
opposition’s negotiation (for a latent variable Perceived Negotiating Position). 
Specifically, the instrument gathered perceptions of the absolute strength of the auditor’s 
negotiating position (very weak vs. very strong), the absolute strength of the opposition’s 
negotiating position (very weak vs. very strong), and the relative favorability of the 
auditors’ settlement position compared to the opposition’s (favor the investors vs. favor 
the auditors), all on scales from 1 to 10. The instrument also gathered three measures of 
the attorney’s willingness to concede on behalf of the auditors during negotiations (for a 
latent variable Willingness to Concede). Specifically, the instrument asked attorneys to 
rate (on scales from 1 to 10) how committed they would be (as auditors’ legal counsel) to 
their initial settlement offer (very weakly committed vs. very strongly committed), and 
how willing they would be to make concessions to reach a settlement with investors’ 
legal counsel (very unwilling vs. very willing). In addition, attorneys rated the range of 
settlement amounts that would be acceptable to them, on a scale starting at 0 for “no 
acceptable range” to 10 (“the acceptable range would be very large”). Finally, to test H3, 
attorneys indicated (as legal counsel for the auditors) the lowest amount they would hope 
to convince the investors’ legal counsel to accept as a proposed settlement (Minimum 
Payout Goal), the highest amount they would be willing to offer the investors’ legal 
counsel as a proposed settlement (Maximum Payout Limit), and the final negotiated 
settlement amount they expected between themselves and the investors’ legal counsel 
(Final Settlement Amount). All three of these amounts were measured in millions of 
96 
 
dollars, and the Final Settlement Amount also gave participants the option of responding 
with “We would not be able to reach a final negotiated settlement amount.” These goals, 
limits, and final settlement amount response variables are consistent with similar 
measures used in other accounting negotiation research (e.g., Hatfield, Agoglia, and 
Sanchez 2008, Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007). 
In addition, the instrument gathered additional supplementary measures related to 
the negotiation process, each one discussed in the Results section, next. Finally, the 
attorney’s responded to manipulation checks and demographic questions. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Likelihood of Being Settled out of Court 
 The instrument asked all attorneys to assess the likelihood that the lawsuit against 
“Jones & Company would end up being settled out of court as opposed to, e.g., going to 
trial”. On a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely), participants’ mean rating was 
8.55, significantly above the midpoint of the scale (t = 20.47, p < 0.001). In addition, the 
attorneys rated how much overlap they thought there would be in the range of settlement 
amounts that would be acceptable to both them and to the investors’ legal counsel, on a 
scale from 0 (there would be no overlap) to 10 (there would be complete overlap). The 
attorneys indicated that there would be a significant amount of overlap (mean 4.24, t = 
21.77, p < 0.001). In fact, no attorneys selected “no overlap,” suggesting that settlement 
negotiations would be unlikely to reach an impasse and go to trial. Finally, my dependent 
variable Final Settlement Amount gave attorneys the option of responding with “We 
would not be able to reach a final negotiated settlement amount” rather than provide a 
dollar figure. Only six out of 74 responses selected this option. Thus, it appears that this 
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case would most likely be settled out of court, consistent with most lawsuits in my 
analysis (Table 4.1) of Palmrose’s (1999) archival database. 
4.4.2 Perceptions of Materiality and Estimate Uncertainty 
 The misstatement is material according to quantitative benchmarks common to 
practice (Eilifsen and Messier 2015), as well as qualitative benchmarks (SEC 1999). To 
test whether attorneys perceived the alleged misstatement to be material, the instrument 
asked how material of an effect the alleged misstatement had on the judgment of a 
reasonable person relying on the financial statements (Materiality−Overall), on a scale 
from 1 (no material impact) to 10 (a highly material impact). Despite being counsel for 
the auditors, the attorneys acknowledged that the alleged misstatement was significantly 
material (mean = 3.46, t = 12.12, p < 0.001), with 71 out of 74 responses (96%) 
acknowledging a material impact. 
 As a manipulation check for disaggregation, the instrument also asked the 
attorneys how material of an impact the alleged misstatement had on the financial 
statement line-item it appeared in (Materiality−Line-item), on a similar scale from 1 to 
10. As expected, the misstatement appeared to have a more material impact on its line-
item in the disaggregated condition than in the aggregated condition (4.38 vs. 3.17, t = 
2.17, p = 0.017), with the means of both conditions indicating a significantly material 
effect of the misstatement on its line-item (p’s < 0.001). Furthermore, the effect of 
disaggregation on the materiality−line-item, in turn, increases attorney’s perceptions of 
the overall impact of the misstatement on the judgment of a reasonable person relying on 
the financial statements (Materiality−Overall) (overall path estimate = 0.233, 95% of 
bias-corrected bootstrapped estimates > 0.078, Hayes 2013; Sobel test = 1.97, p = 0.025). 
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Thus, it appears that my manipulation of disaggregation was successful, in that it 
predictably influenced attorneys’ perceptions of the impact of the material 
misstatement.23  
 To check my manipulation of estimate uncertainty, the instrument asked 
participants to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 the degree of uncertainty surrounding the 
valuation model’s inputs, assumptions and estimation of the impairment loss. The 
attorneys’ uncertainty ratings were significantly higher in the high-uncertainty conditions 
than in the low-uncertainty conditions (8.05 vs. 4.61, t = 6.57, p < 0.001). Thus, the 
uncertainty manipulation appears to have been successful.24  
 Because I use them as manipulation checks, both materiality ratings and the 
uncertainty ratings appeared at the end of the instrument, right before demographic 
questions, and right after all other response variables, with the “back” button suppressed 
so that asking the manipulation check questions could not influence attorney’s responses 
to any of my dependent variables. 
                                                          
23 Jurors in the second study of my dissertation exhibited similar effects of disaggregation increasing 
Materiality−Line-item, which, in turn, increased Materiality−Overall. Directly comparing attorney’s 
Materiality−Line-item and Materiality−Overall judgments to those of the jurors in the same four conditions 
in the second study of my dissertation, the only significant difference in their judgments is a main effect of 
participant type such that jurors, on average, judged the misstatement to have a more material impact on 
Materiality−Line-item and Materiality−Overall than did attorneys, across all experimental conditions (p’s < 
0.001). This effect likely reflects the directional goals and motivated reasoning of attorneys as legal counsel 
for the auditors (Kunda 1990).  
24 The uncertainty manipulation also significantly influenced jurors’ perceptions of uncertainty in the 
second study of my dissertation (p < 0.001). Comparing attorneys’ and jurors’ judgments directly, 
attorneys’ uncertainty ratings appear to be more sensitive than jurors’ to the different levels of estimate 
uncertainty. That is, the difference between attorneys’ uncertainty ratings in the high and low uncertainty 
conditions (8.05 vs. 4.61) is significantly larger (t = 5.47, p < 0.001) than the same difference in jurors’ 


















































4.28 3.94 7.62 3.43 7.52 
 
4.90 4.76 3.40 $13.67 $5.42 $10.67 
(1.93) (1.59) (1.07) (1.08) (1.25) 
 
(2.39) (2.61) (1.73) ($10.72) ($5.11) ($9.01) 
[18] [18] [21] [21] [21] 
 
[21] [21] [20] [18] [18] [18] 
             Low Estimate 
Uncertainty, 
Disaggregation 
4.72 4.28 7.57 3.29 6.71 
 
4.95 6.10 3.71 16.81 $7.17 $14.47 
(2.22) (1.93) (1.25) (1.10) (1.98) 
 
(2.25) (2.26) (1.74) (12.67) ($7.41) ($14.44) 
[18] [18] [21] [21] [21] 
 
[21] [21] [21] [18] [18] [15] 
 
     
 
      
Low Estimate 
Uncertainty 
4.50 4.11 7.60 3.36 7.12 
 
4.93 5.43 3.56 15.24 $6.30 $12.57 
(2.08) (1.76) (1.16) (1.09) (1.61) 
 
(2.32) (2.43) (1.73) (11.70) ($6.26) ($11.73) 
[36] [36] [42] [42] [42] 
 
[42] [42] [41] [36] [36] [33] 
 
     
 




5.65 5.30 7.09 4.30 6.57 
 
4.09 6.22 5.13 21.75 $8.78 $20.72 
(2.11) (2.00) (1.59) (1.99) (1.97) 
 
(2.19) (1.76) (1.42) (13.34) ($14.58) ($20.67) 
20 20 23 23 23 
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4.95 4.50 7.18 4.00 6.73 
 
4.41 6.32 4.00 20.25 $8.55 $18.13 
(1.99) (2.14) (1.53) (1.48) (1.58) 
 
(2.15) (1.59) (1.38) (18.51) ($11.90) ($16.67) 
20 20 22 22 22 
 
22 22 22 20 20 19 
             
High Estimate 
Uncertainty 
5.30 4.90 7.14 4.15 6.65 
 
4.25 6.27 4.57 21.00 $8.67 $19.43 
(2.05) (2.07) (1.56) (1.73) (1.78) 
 
(2.17) (1.67) (1.40) (15.92) ($13.24) ($18.67) 
[40] [40] [45] [45] [45]   [45] [45] [45] [38] [38] [35] 
  ANOVA p-values a 
Estimate 
Uncertainty a 
0.048 0.040 0.063 0.007 0.103   0.081 0.032  0.002 0.043 0.167 0.038 
Aggregation 0.788 0.601 0.937 0.482 0.385 
 
0.702 0.112 0.232 0.806 0.756 0.874 
Interaction 0.231 0.207 0.811 0.799 0.193   0.776 0.171  0.036 0.487 0.686 0.406 
a 
Estimate uncertainty influences each variable in the direction suggested by my theory, and the associated p-values are one-tailed.
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4.4.3 Hypothesis Tests 
 Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics and ANOVA results for every response 
variable used in my tests of H1 through H4 and RQ1. As the ANOVA results suggest, I 
find evidence of a generally consistent main effect of estimate uncertainty increasing 
attorney’s predictions of jurors judgment against auditors, decreasing attorney’s 
perceived negotiating position, increasing their willingness to concede, increasing the 
negotiating goals and limits they have for auditors’ payout to plaintiffs, and increasing 
their anticipated final settlement amount. While these initial tests are informative, a more 
formal test of my theory across these variables follows, using structural equations 
modeling, which provides more powerful tests of my theory by (1) controlling for 
measurement error, (2) estimating structural relationships between variables, (3) 
estimating the significance of the overall causal path posited by my theory, and (4) 
providing goodness of fit estimates between the theoretical structural model and my 
theory, none of which are possible using ANOVA analyses alone. I turn to specific 
hypothesis tests, next. 
 H1 (H2) predicts that lawyers will incorrectly predict mock jurors’ standard of 
care (negligence judgments) for auditors to be higher when estimate uncertainty is high 
than when estimate uncertainty is low. As Table 4.2 shows, Estimate Uncertainty appears 
to significantly increase attorneys’ Perceived Juror Standard of Care (4.50 vs. 5.30, t = 
1.69, p = 0.048) and their Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments (4.11 vs. 4.90, t = 1.77, 
p = 0.040).  
Comparing these predictions of the mock jurors’ judgments to the actual jurors’ 
judgments, the attorneys’ beliefs about jurors are systematically incorrect, and, in fact, 
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even go systematically in the opposite direction under some conditions. Specifically, 
estimate uncertainty caused the mock jurors to decrease (rather than increase) their 
Standard of Care for auditors when the financial statements were disaggregated (Figure 
3.1, t = −2.64, p = 0.009), and had no significant effect on their Standard of Care 
judgments when the financial statements were aggregated (Figure 3.1, t = −0.57, p = 
0.57). Similarly, estimate uncertainty caused the mock jurors to decrease (rather than 
increase) their Negligence Judgments when the financial statements were disaggregated 
(Figure 3.3, t = −1.31, p = 0.096), and had no significant effect on their Negligence 
Judgments when the financial statements were aggregated (Figure 3.3, t = 1.09, p = 0.28). 
In particular, jurors’ judgments were harshest against auditors in the disaggregated, low 
estimate uncertainty condition, which was significantly higher than each of the other 
three conditions for both jurors’ Standard of Care (p’s ≤ 0.096; Figure 3.1) and their 
Negligence judgments (p’s ≤ 0.076; Figure 3.3). In no case was this true of attorneys’ 
predictions of jurors’ judgments, which presumed that low estimate uncertainty would 
lead to lower (not higher) juror standard of care and negligence judgments. Thus, 
estimate uncertainty significantly increased attorneys’ Perceived Juror Standard of Care 
and Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments, and did so incorrectly. These results support 
H1 and H2.  
To test H3, I construct a structural equations model of the data to test the 
theoretical structural model posited in Figure 4.1. Results of the structural equations 
model appear in Figure 4.2. Overall model fit indices are very strong (RMSEA = 0.028, 
CFI = 0.993, Tucker-Lewis Index = 0.991, SRMR = 0.076), suggesting that this model 
provides an excellent fit to the data (see Brown 2015). The first link in the model shows 
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that high Estimate Uncertainty significantly increases attorneys’ Perceived Juror 
Standard of Care (a = 0.414, p = 0.036), replicating my tests of H1. Higher Perceived 
Juror Standard of Care, in turn, significantly increases Perceived Juror Negligence 
Judgments (b = 0.588, p < 0.001). In addition, the product-of-coefficients a×b is 
significantly positive (a×b = 0.243, 95% of bias-corrected bootstrapped estimates > 
0.028, Hayes 2013; Sobel test = 1.70, p = 0.044), suggesting that high levels of Estimate 
Uncertainty increases Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments, doing so through its 










Figure 4.2, continued 
Structural Equation Model 











Path from Estimate Uncertainty to 
Final Settlement Amount through 
Minimum Payout Goal (i.e., path 




estimates > 0.036  
Significant 
j 
Path from Estimate Uncertainty to 
Final Settlement Amount through 
Maximum Payout Limit (i.e., 




estimates > 0.046  
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a Estimate Uncertainty is coded using effects coding (cf. Little et al. 2006), and equals 1 
for participants in the high uncertainty conditions, −1 otherwise. 
b Perceived Juror Standard of Care represents lawyers’ predictions of mock jurors’ 
standard of care for auditors in this case (on a 10-point scale). 
c Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments  represents lawyers’ predictions of mock jurors’ 
negligence judgments of the auditors in this case (on a 10-point scale). 
d Perceived Negotiating Position represents a latent variable estimated using three 
measured variables, (1) participants’ perceptions of the absolute strength of their own 
negotiating position, (2) their perceptions of the absolute strength of the opposing legal 
counsel’s negotiating position, and (3) their perceived favorability of their out-of-court 
settlement position relative to the opposing legal counsel’s (all on 10 point scales). The 
second of these variables was reverse-coded, so that higher values indicate a stronger 
position relative to the opposition.  
e Willingness to Concede  represents a latent variable estimated using three measured 
variables, lawyers’ (1) willingness to make concessions to reach a settlement with the 
investors’ legal counsel, (2) level of commitment to their initial settlement offer (both 
rated on 10 point scales), and (3) acceptable range of negotiation outcomes. The second 
of these variable was reverse coded, since, the lower the level of commitment to an 
initial settlement offer, the more willingness there is to make further concessions from 
the initial offer.  
f  Minimum Payout Goal represents lawyers’ lowest payout they would hope to convince 
the investor’s legal counsel to accept as a proposed settlement, in $ millions. Larger 
values represent larger minimum payouts sought (i.e., less ambitious goals). 
g  Maximum Payout Limit represents lawyers’ highest payout they would be willing to 




Figure 4.2, continued 
Structural Equation Model 
 
h The estimated covariance between Minimum Payout Goal and Maximum Payout Limit 
(represented in the model by the double-headed arcing arrow) controls for individual 
reasons why lawyers’ goals and limits would co-vary. Specifically, since some lawyers 
are likely to be “tougher” negotiators than others (i.e., individual variability exists), I 
expect that more (less) ambitious individual negotiating goals would tend to co-occur 
with more (less) ambitious individual negotiating limits. As expected, this covariance is 
positive and significant (p < 0.001). 
i  Final Settlement Amount  represents the final negotiated amount that auditors’ lawyers 
expect the auditors to settle for and pay to investors, in $ millions. 
j The overall paths are tested using bootstrapping procedures (cf. Preacher, Rucker and 
Hayes 2007; Hayes 2013). This bootstrapping procedure took 5,000 subsamples of the 
experimental sample, estimating the structural equation model and its path coefficients 
5,000 times. Within a single subsample, an overall path is tested using the products of 
its path coefficients, for which signed expectations can be formed. Across all 5,000 
subsamples, the procedure counts the number of subsamples that generated an overall 
path coefficient with the expected sign. If at least 95% of the subsamples generated a 
signed overall path coefficient in the expected direction (i.e., if the 95% bootstrapped 






H3 suggests that the effects of Estimate Uncertainty on Perceived Juror Standard 
of Care and Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments will, in turn, decrease the attorney’s 
perceptions of their negotiating position as legal counsel for the auditors, leading to more 
willingness to concede, higher negotiated payout goals and limits, and, ultimately, higher 
final settlement outcomes expected for the auditor to pay. As discussed in Section IV (see 
also Table 4.2), I use three measures of attorneys’ perceived negotiation position to 
construct the latent variable Perceived Negotiation Position, and three measures of 
attorneys’ willingness to concede to construct the latent variable Willingness to 
Concede.25 
As the results in Figure 4.2 show, the effect of Estimate Uncertainty increasing 
Perceived Juror Standard of Care and, in turn, Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments 
led to a decrease in the attorney’s Perceived Negotiating Position (c = −0.357, p < 0.001). 
This decrease in Perceived Negotiating Position, in turn, leads to an increase in the 
                                                          
25 Perceived Negotiating Position and Willingness to Concede are estimated using effects coding for latent 
variables within confirmatory factor analysis (Little, Slegers and Card 2006). The three measures used 
for Perceived Negotiating Position are: (1) lawyers’ perceptions of the absolute strength of their own 
negotiating position, (2) their perceptions of the absolute strength of the opposing legal counsel’s 
negotiating position, and (3) their perceived favorability of their out-of-court settlement position relative 
to the opposing legal counsel’s. The second of these three variables was reverse coded, so that higher 
values of this latent variable indicate that the lawyers perceive that they are in a stronger negotiating 
position relative to the opposing legal counsel. As expected, the factor loadings for each of these 
variables are positive and significant (0.983, 0.015 and 1.002, respectively; p’s < 0.001). The three 
measures used for Willingness to Concede are: (1) lawyers’ willingness to make concessions to reach a 
settlement with the investors’ legal counsel, (2) lawyers’ level of commitment to their initial settlement 
offer, and (3) lawyers’ acceptable range of negotiation outcomes. The second of these variable was 
reverse coded, since, the lower the level of commitment to an initial settlement offer, the more 
willingness there is to make further concessions from the initial offer. As expected, the factor loadings 
for each of these variables are positive and significant (1.068, 1.046, and 0.886, respectively; p’s < 
0.001). Convergent and divergent validity tests using either CFA or EFA measurement approaches 
suggest that the three measures used for each of these latent variables relate to the same construct, and 
measure constructs that are distinct from the other constructs in this SEM (see, e.g., Harrington 2009). As 
latent variables, Perceived Negotiating Position and Willingness to Concede are represented in the Figure 
3 by ovals, following SEM graphing norms (e.g., Brown 2015).  
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attorneys’ Willingness to Concede (d = −0.833, p < 0.001).26 This increase in attorney’s 
Willingness to Concede leads attorneys adopt less ambitious negotiation strategies, in the 
form of larger Minimum Payout Goals and Maximum Payout Limits for out-of-court 
settlement negotiations (e1 = 3.330, p = 0.029; and e2 = 6.330, p = 0.001; respectively). 
Finally, larger Minimum Payout Goals and Maximum Payout Limits both lead to larger 
expected Final Settlement Amounts for auditors to pay plaintiffs (f1 = 0.748, p < 0.001; 
and f2 = 0.561, p < 0.001; respectively). 
As my formal test of H3, I determine whether the entire path depicted in Figure 
4.2, starting at Estimate Uncertainty, running through all mediators, and ending at Final 
Settlement Amounts is significantly positive (that is, whether Estimate Uncertainty 
increases Final Settlement Amounts through the path posited by H3 and my theoretical 
model).27 This test is performed by determining whether the product-of-coefficients 
a×b×c×d×(e1×f1+e2×f2) is significantly positive. Note that my theoretical model (Figure 
4.1) predicts that this product should be positive, or in other words that the hypothesized 
path ultimately explains high Estimate Uncertainty causing an increase in Final 
Settlement Amounts. As summarized in Figure 4.3, the structural equation model’s 
estimate of this overall path product is 0.438, which is significantly positive (95% of 
bias-corrected bootstrap estimates > 0.099). This result supports H3.28  
                                                          
26 The negative coefficient d = −0.833 means that a decrease (increase) in Perceived Negotiating Position 
leads to an increase (decrease) in Willingness to Concede. That is, Perceived Negotiating Position and 
Willingness to Concede go in opposite directions.  
27 This test confirms that the relationships shown in Figure 3 are not simply a chain of unrelated bivariate 
correlations, but rather that the effects of Estimate Uncertainty on Perceived Juror Standard of Care flows 
through the structural model to each subsequent variable and ultimately to Final Settlement Amounts.  
28 In addition, I also test whether the subpath through Negotiating Goals (i.e., a×b×c×d×e1×f1) and the 
subpath through Negotiating Limits (i.e., a×b×c×d×e2×f2) in Figure 3 is significantly positive. I find that 
each of these subpaths is significantly positive (subpath through Negotiating Goals = 0.180, 95% of bias-
corrected bootstrapped estimates > 0.036; and subpath through Negotiating Limits = 0.257, 95% of bias-
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This result for H3 also suggests that attorney’s incorrect perceptions of jurors 
makes them too willing to concede out of mistaken beliefs about their vulnerability to 
jurors when estimate uncertainty is high. The fact that these effects flow through to the 
dollar amounts of negotiation goals, limits, and final settlement amounts suggests that 
these mistaken beliefs can potentially result in unnecessary financial payouts on the part 
of auditors. As Table 4.2 shows, attorneys’ Final Settlement Amount varied from $12.57 
million when Estimate Uncertainty is low to $19.43 million when Estimate Uncertainty 
is high (t = 1.80, p = 0.038).29 Additional SEM analyses (not tabulated) suggest that the 
overall hypothesized path (Figure 4.1) fully mediates the total effect of Estimate 
Uncertainty on Final Settlement Amount shown in Table 4.2.30 
H4 predicts that attorneys’ Perceived Juror Standard of Care and Perceived Juror 
Negligence Judgments will not correctly reflect the joint effects of Estimate Uncertainty 
and Disaggregation on jurors’ actual judgments (Figure 3.1 and 3.3). RQ1 asks whether 
Disaggregation will influence attorneys’ Perceived Juror Standard of Care and 
Perceived Juror Negligence judgments at all. As Table 4.2 shows, I detect no effects of 
Disaggregation (in main effect or interaction) on Perceived Juror Standard of Care or on 
Perceived Juror Negligence Judgments. Thus, attorneys’ predictions of mock juror 
judgments do not appear to accurately reflect the joint effects of disaggregation and 
estimate uncertainty present in mock jurors’ actual judgments (Figure 3.1 and 3.3). These 
                                                                                                                                                                             
corrected bootstrapped estimates > 0.046). Note that the two subpath estimates sum to the estimate of the 
overall path (i.e., 0.438). 
29 By way of comparison, the US Treasury (2008) reports that the largest six accounting firms paid out 
$5.66 billion to settle over 362 cases from 1995-2007, an average settlement of $15.64 million per case in 
this period. Thus, the attorneys’ in my experiment settled for relatively more for the Jones & Company 
audit of Big Time Gravel, but still in an amount similar to cases from 1995-2007. 
30 That is, the significant effect of Estimate Uncertainty on Final Settlement Amount (p = 0.038, Table 2) 
becomes statistically insignificant after controlling for the significant indirect path depicted in Figure 2 (p = 
0.858). More specifically, these supplementary SEM analyses suggest that the indirect path depicted in 
Figure 2 accounts for 77.4% of the total effect size of Estimate Uncertainty on Final Settlement Amount. 
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results support H4. In addition, with respect to RQ1, as Table 4.2 shows, Disaggregation 
does not appear to systematically influence attorneys’ predictions of juror judgments or 
any of their resulting negotiation behaviors. Thus, despite Disaggregation significantly 
influencing attorneys’ perceptions of Materiality−Line-item, which, in turn, influenced 
Materiality−Overall, it does not impact their subsequent negotiation behaviors, likely 
because it does not impact their perceptions of juror judgments.  
4.4.4 Supplementary Analyses 
 The instrument asked the lawyers how cooperative or contentious negotiations 
would be, on a scale from 1 (more cooperative) to 10 (more contentious), and how long it 
would take to negotiate a settlement for this case, on a scale from 1 (a short amount of 
time) to 10 (a long amount of time). The lawyers’ mean ratings are 6.45 and 6.32, 
respectively, each significantly above the midpoint of the scale (t = 4.96, p < 0.001, and t 
= 4.30, p < 0.001, respectively). Thus, the lawyers believed that settlement of this case 
would be relatively contentious and take a relatively long time. These ratings did not vary 
by experimental condition (p’s ≥ 0.78). 
 The instrument also asked the lawyers to rate how large the opposing legal 
counsel’s range of acceptable settlements would be, on a scale from 0 (no acceptable 
range) to 10 (very large). The lawyers expected the opposing side to have a significant 
range of acceptable settlements (mean rating = 5.81, t = 25.95, p < 0.001). This rating did 
not vary by experimental condition (omnibus F = 0.65, p = 0.59), consistent with prior 
research suggesting that, in competitive negotiation settings, thinking through details of 
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the opposition’s negotiation strategies is difficult (e.g., Trotman, Wright, and Wright 
2005; Bowlin 2011).31  
 Finally, the instrument measured lawyers’ own beliefs about the proper standard 
of care, and lawyers’ own beliefs about auditor negligence, each on scales from 1 to 10. 
For both of these measures, lawyers’ beliefs do not vary by experimental condition (p’s ≥ 
0.36), suggesting that the significant effects of Estimate Uncertainty on lawyers’ Final 
Negotiated Settlements are best explained by lawyers’ incorrect predictions of jurors 
beliefs (Figure 4.2), rather than by their own beliefs about auditor negligence and the 
standard of care. The fact that lawyers are willing to make more financial concessions 
during negotiation when estimate uncertainty is high, despite personally believing that the 
auditors are no more negligent when estimate uncertainty is high, provides additional 
evidence that lawyers tend to make unnecessary auditor payout concessions out of 
mistaken beliefs about juror judgments.32  
4.5 Conclusion 
Findings from this study have important implications for the accounting and 
auditing literature on high estimate uncertainty and its effects. As contemporary financial 
statements include estimates of increasingly higher uncertainty, accounting researchers 
                                                          
31 In addition, the instrument asked the lawyers to estimate the lowest dollar amount the opposing legal 
counsel would be willing to settle for. In this case, I do find a main effect suggesting that they expected the 
opposition to be in a stronger negotiating position when Estimate Uncertainty is high (t = 1.38, p = 0.087), 
consistent with the rest of my findings. However, I also find a significant Estimate Uncertainty × 
Disaggregation interaction, suggesting that this effect of Estimate Uncertainty may only occur when the 
financial statements are aggregated (F = 4.77, p = 0.032). However, this unpredicted interaction is generally 
not robust across my dependent variables. Future research may investigate lawyers’ expectations of the 
opposition’s negotiating strategies further, including whether this interaction appears persistent or 
idiosyncratic.  
32 Comparing lawyers’ Standard of Care and Negligence Judgments directly to jurors’ judgments, I find 
that (in addition to lawyers not exhibiting the pattern of means shown in Figure 1 for jurors), lawyers’ 
Standard of Care and Negligence Judgments tend to be lower than jurors’ (p’s < 0.001). As with a similar 
difference in materiality perceptions, this result likely reflects lawyers’ directional goals and motivated 
reasoning as legal counsel for the auditors (Kunda 1990). 
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and practitioners have expressed concern that such high uncertainty will increase auditor 
liability to onerous levels (e.g., Christensen et al. 2012; Bell and Griffin 2012). Results of 
this study suggest that the impact of high estimate uncertainty on auditor litigation risk 
for undetected misstatements goes in opposite directions depending on whether a case is 
decided by jurors or settled by attorneys in out-of-court settlement. While high estimate 
uncertainty leads jurors to judge auditors less harshly for undetected material 
misstatements in relatively disaggregated financial statement line-items in the second 
study of my dissertation, results of this study show that lawyers reading the same case as 
legal counsel for the auditors tend to concede more in out-of-court settlements when 
estimate uncertainty is high. Consistent with my theory, results of the experiment show 
that these directionally opposite effects stem from lawyers’ inability to predict jurors’ 
judgments accurately.  
This study also makes important and early contributions to the small literature on 
out-of-court settlement to resolve auditor resolution. Little is known about out-of-court 
resolution of audit litigation in the accounting literature (Donelson et al. 2014). Findings 
of this study demonstrate that auditors’ legal counsel may unnecessarily concede 
economically significant financial payouts on behalf of audit firms in response to high 
uncertainty, out of mistaken beliefs about juror judgments. Thus, lawyers' 
misunderstanding of their clients’ vulnerability to jurors can carry significant and 
unnecessary costs for auditors, in the most common venue for resolving auditor 
negligence litigation. For example, in this study, high levels of estimate uncertainty led to 
an increase in expected final payouts from auditors from $12.57 million to $19.43 
million, a 54.6% increase, and results indicated further that attorneys’ (incorrect) beliefs 
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about juror judgments in the study primarily accounted for this increase. Such effects 
may unnecessarily increase the substantial litigation burden that audit firms face, with the 
largest six accounting firms paying $5.66 billion to resolve over 362 cases from 1995-
2007 (US Treasury 2008). In 2007, 15.1% of audit related revenue went to litigation and 
practice protection costs (US Treasury 2008). 
Of course, this study examines only two experimental factors on lawyers’ 
judgments. Future research may develop other factors which cause the accuracy of 
attorney’s perceptions of vulnerability to juries to improve. The accounting literature 
would benefit from additional research building our understanding of out-of-court 
settlement, and when it appropriately manages, minimizes, or unnecessarily increases 
auditors’ litigation risk. This study provides a theoretical starting point by pointing out 
how (consistent with psychology theory) expert-attorneys may overconfidently ascribe 
overly simplistic behavioral mental models to novice-jurors’ judgments, underestimating 
the extent to which novices are at least boundedly rational as experts may be prone to do 
when doing the difficult task of predicting others’ behavior. In addition, this study 
identifies estimate uncertainty as an important factor if this phenomenon exists. That is, 
boundedly rational jurors may react to high estimate uncertainty in an undetected 
misstatement by altering their attributions to audit negligence, altering their attributions 
to chance factors, and/or altering the amount of judgment they hold in reserve, consistent 
with Attribution Theory. In contrast, if expert attorneys hold an overly simplistic view of 
novice jurors, they may simply expect them to react to high estimate uncertainty by 
simply attributing more blame to auditors (i.e., as the failed guardians of certainty). Thus, 
based on the position that expert attorneys may be poor predictors of novice juror 
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judgments, my study tested estimate uncertainty as a factor that may well create 
directionally opposite effects on juror judgments versus attorney’s settlements based on 
their beliefs about juror judgments. Future research in this under-studied area of out-of-
court audit litigation settlement can build upon this theoretical foundation by identifying 
other accounting task factors and thinking about their implications given the different 
perspectives jurors and lawyers bring to the setting. Some may similarly create divergent 
effects on auditor liability, given the differences between juror and lawyer judgments, 
while others may create convergent effects. 
Finally, this study makes an important contribution to the accounting literature on 
auditors’ litigation risk overall. Although the vast majority of audit litigation is resolved 
out of court (Table 4.1), the vast majority of accounting research on the disposition of 
audit litigation has focused on juror judgments. This focus of the literature implicitly (and 
sometimes explicitly) assumes that juror judgments are a good proxy for auditors’ 
litigation risk because out-of-court settlements would presumably reflect when auditors 
would or would not be more vulnerable to juries. However, as both accounting and legal 
scholars point out, it is not yet well understood how accurate lawyers’ expectations about 
juries may be during out-of-court settlement negotiations (e.g., Donelson et al. 2014, 
Seabury 2013). Results of this study demonstrate that lawyers’ predictions of juror 
judgments can be systematically inaccurate (even in ways that are directionally opposite 
to juror judgments), and that these incorrect predictions can in fact roll forward to affect 
lawyers’ negotiating strategies and financial concessions on behalf of auditors. Thus, this 
study demonstrates that juror judgments are not a good proxy for the litigation risk faced 
by auditors in out-of-court settlement negotiations. Thus, just as juror cases present only 
114 
 
a partial picture of all audit litigation cases (Table 4.1; Palmrose 1999), they also present 
only a partial picture of auditors’ litigation risk. My findings may help motivate future 
research on out-of-court settlement of auditor litigation, in order to gain a better 
understanding of auditors’ litigation risk, which may not always be well proxied by juror 
judgments.  
Like all empirical research, this study has limitations. There are a number of different 
factors that relate to the task, decision-maker, and legal environmental that I do not 
examine that could impact my findings. Future research could examine how other factors 
may change the effects demonstrated in this study. Nevertheless, this study contributes to 
our understanding of the important and yet poorly understood topic of out-of-court 






In three independent essays, I examined how estimate uncertainty, financial 
statement aggregation, audit quality indicators, a company's investor base, and the size of 
the alleged misstatement can impact auditor liability. I find that jurors believe that an 
auditor is more likely to be found negligent when the AQIs indicate that the auditor 
performed a poor quality audit than when the AQIs are mixed or indicate the auditor 
performed a high quality audit. Additionally, I find that jurors believe the auditors is 
more likely to be found negligent when the financial statements are disaggregated and 
estimate uncertainty is low. In contrast, attorneys mispredict juror judgments and assume 
that jurors will hold the auditor to be more negligent when estimate uncertainty is high. 
The attorneys then use their misprediction of juror judgment to make unnecessary 
concessions in out of court settlement. 
These findings have important implications for standard setters, audit 
practitioners, litigators, and accounting researchers. While practitioners have expressed 
some concern about the mandated disclosure of audit quality indicators, my results 
suggest that firms' concerns may be unwarranted as long as they do not perform a poor 
quality audit. Additionally, the flexibility provided in financial reporting regulations on 
how aggregated the income statement is could provide auditors with legal liability 
protection. Finally, while the degree of estimate uncertainty is increasing in the financial 
statements, its impact of auditor liability depends on whether a case goes to court and 
gets decided by a jury or is settled out of court by attorneys. This is both informative to 
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audit firms' legal counsel as they attempt to negotiate fairly for their client and for 
accounting researchers as they try to understand factors that impact auditor liability. 
There are many promising avenues for future research. It is still unclear how these 
five variables could impact other aspects of the auditors' work environment. Future 
research could also explore additional factors that might cause attorneys to mispredict 
juror judgments. More research is also needed to explore other aspects of pre-trial 
settlement negotiations that can influence auditor liability. It is the hope of the author that 
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